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Over the last decade, the Canadian corporate law firm, like its counterparts in other industrialized countries,
has undergone a profound transformation, the most remarkable feature of which has been the rapid growth of
individual firms. Whereas a mere decade ago only one Canadian firm could boast of having more than 100
lawyers, today there are at least 19 firms that can make this claim. Accompanying the firms' rapid growth has
been their steady expansion into distant national and international markets. Significantly, even when that
expansion has been confined to local markets, law firms have invoked a much broader array of growth
instruments than in the past. In place of singular reliance upon the standard practice of recruitment directly
from law schools and subsequent promotion through the ranks, law firms have shown themselves willing to
deploy other methods including lateral recruitment ('cherry picking'), greenfielding, affiliations,and mergers.
Interestingly, while the rationale for rapid law firm growth has been given belated, though careful, attention by
legal academics, the issue of the mechanisms by which that growth can be achieved has been virtually ignored.
This oversight is curious. By understanding the calculus governing the choice of growth instruments,
important light can be cast on the structure of and rationale for the modern law firm, and on the way in which
it has coped with the stresses and strains of a dramatically changing market environment.
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Ronald J. Daniels* GROWING PAINS: 
THE WHY AND HOW 
OF LAW FIRM EXPANSIONt 
Over the last decade, the Canadian corporate law firm,' like its counter-
parts in other industrialized countries, has undergone a profound trans-
fo rma t i~n ,~the most remarkable feature of which has been the rapid 
growth of individual firms. Whereas a mere decade ago only one 
Canadian firm could boast of having more than 100 lawyers, today there 
are at least 19 firms that can make this claim.' Accompanying the firms' 
rapid growth has been their steady expansion into distant national and 
international markets. Significantly, even when that expansion has been 
confined to local markets, law firms have invoked a much broader array 
of growth instruments than in the past. In place of singular reliance upon 
the standard practice of recruitment directly from law schools and subse-
quent promotion through the ranks, law firms have shown themselves 
willing to deploy other methods including lateral recruitment ('cherry 
picking'), greenfielding, affiliations,and mergers.' Interestingly, while the 
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto 
t I am indebted to Tim Heeney, Michael Kelly, Jim Craven, and Kelly Friedman for 
superb research assistance rendered through all stages of this project. Debra Forman. 
the international business and trade law librarian at the Faculty of Law, University 
of Toronto, ingeniously and doggedly tracked down elusive data. Pia Bruni cheerfully 
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annual meeting and at Georgetown Law School. Thanks are also owed to senior 
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initiated. Of course, any responsibility for errors is purely my own. The research for 
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1 In this article, I use the terms corporate law firm and law firm interchangeably. This 
is because my focus is exclusively on the large corporate law firm. Such firms are 
characterized by their commitment to servicing the needs of corporate as opposed to 
individual clients.Although much of the analysis developed in this article may be easily 
applied to non-corporate law firms, there are several distinctive challenges being faced 
by small and medium-sized firms that must be accounted for in considering their 
growth and performance, and which I have ignored. 
2 The operation of the modern corporate law firm is extensively explored in R. Nelson 
Partners with Power (Berkeley: University of California Press 1988). 
3 See section III below. 
4 See Galanter 'Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States' in 
R. Dingwall and P. Lewis (eds)Tb Sociology of the Ifofessions (London: MacMillan 1983) 
162. 
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rationale for rapid law firm growth has been given belated, though 
careful, attention by legal academic^,^ the issue of the mechanisms by 
which that growth can be achieved has been virtually ignored. This 
oversight is curious. By understanding the calculus governing the choice 
of growth instruments, important light can be cast on the structure of 
and rationale for the modern law firm, and on the way in which it has 
coped with the stresses and strains of a dramatically changing market 
environment. 
In this article, I examine the changing nature of the law firm in 
several distinct stages. In section I, I provide a thumbnail sketch of the 
activities, structure, and governance of the modern corporate law firm. 
In section 11, I discuss the theory of the firm and its application to the 
legal partnership. Then, in section 111, I examine in greater detail the 
phenomenon of rapid law firm growth, focusing on the burgeoning size 
and geographic scope of the firm. Although Galanter and Palay have 
offered a supply-side theory of law firm growth, I argue that it is beset 
by several deficiencies, and offer an alternative explanation for the 
phenomenon. In section IV, I evaluate the range of different instruments 
available to bring about growth, while remaining attentive to the law 
firm's dual objectives: to provide the level and type of services that best 
satisfy consumer demand and to minimize the internal costs of produc- 
tion, particularly those costs that are related to lawyer opportunism. 
Unfortunately, no instrument is perfect in being able to fulfil both of 
these objectives across all contexts, and I develop a hierarchy that ranks 
different growth instruments on the basis of their relative costs and bene- 
fits in local, national, and international settings. Finally, in section V, 
drawing on the results of an extensive set of interviews I conducted over 
a one-year period with senior lawyers in 40 leading Canadian law firms, 
I evaluate the strength of the theoretical claims advanced in section IV. 
I 	 The modern corporate law firm 
The modern corporate law firm specializes in the delivery of complex 
legal services to large, sophisticated corporate clients. The services 
provided by corporate law firms take the form of advice rendered to 
clients on how to maximize the value they can lawfully receive from 
transactions executed within the contours of the existing legal frame- 
5 	See M. Galanter and T. Palay 'Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion to Partner 
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms' (1990) 76 Va. LR 747. 
work.= One of the hallmarks of the corporate law firm is the wide scope 
and depth of its expertise. The same law firm may have legal specialists 
practising in areas as diverse as tax, antitrust, securities law, real estate, 
bankruptcy, litigation, and commercial law. The corporate law firm's dis- 
tinctive strength comes from its ability to create ad hoc teams of lawyers 
drawn from a number of different specialties to provide advice to clients 
respecting their activities. For example, the tide of mergers and acqui- 
sitions work that swept North American markets during the 1980s rou- 
tinely required lawyers fi-om a number of different practice areas to work 
together in structuring these transactions or defensive responses to them. 
The highly specialized nature of the corporate law firm's production 
function is also reflected in the extensive reliance the firm places on 
support staff, both paralegal and administrative. The paralegal staff 
enables the firm's lawyers to devolve responsibility over relatively mun- 
dane, routine tasks such as reviewing and filing court documents, prepar- 
ing and filing incorporations and corporate changes, and examining and 
registering real estate titles; the large, highly differentiated administra- 
tive staff allows lawyers to benefit from sophisticated legal research 
services, round-the-clock secretarial and word-processing facilities, as well 
as other sundry services (catering, messenger, telecopier, and so forth). 
Most law firms are structured as professional partnerships.' For the 
6 As Gilson has observed: '[Wlhat business lawyers r edy  do - their potential to create 
value - is simply this: Lawyers function as tram&ion cost engineers, devising efficient 
mechanisms which bridge the gap between ... [the] world of perfect markets and 
the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this world.' 'Value Creation 
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing' (1984) 94 Yale LJ 239 at 255. 
See also R. Kagan and R. Rosen 'On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm 
Practice' (1985) 37 Stan. LR 399. 
7 In some American states, law firms can be organized as true limited liability 
corporations, permitting limited liability for lawyers and even allowing non-lawyer 
investors to hold equity in the firm. These firms are, however, exceptional. Although 
other American states and at least one Canadian province, Alberta, permit law firms 
to incorporate, the benefits of incorporation are largely confined to the realization of 
certain tax benefits. The firm does not enjoy limited liability insofar as creditor claims 
are concerned, nor are non-lawyers entitled to hold equity interests. See J. Robert 
Prichard 'Incorporation by Lawyers' in J. Evans and M. Trebilcock (eds) Lauym and 
the Consumer Interest (Toronto: Butterworths 1982) 303. American data on limited lia- 
bility is reviewed in B. Eaton A.ofes.ssiofltL1 C o ' p w a t h  and Associath, Business Organi- 
zations, vol. 17 (New York: Matthew Bender 1987), 9-44.2-9-46. See also the debate 
between Carr and Mathewson and Gilson respecting the role of limited liability as a 
barrier to entry into the legal profession: J. Carr and F. Mathewson 'Unlimited Lia- 
bility as a Barrier to Entry' (1988) 96 J. of Pol. Econ. 766; and R. Gilson 'Unlimited 
Liability and Law Firm Organization: Tax Factors and the Direction of Causation' 
Working Paper no. 63. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford 
University. 
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most part, the partnership form of organization means that law firm 
partners have unlimited personal liability for debts incurred by the part- 
nership. Consequently, each partner's personal wealth can be seized to 
satisfy debts incurred by other members of the partnership in the course 
of partnership business. In addition to personal liability, partnership 
status also confers clear rights upon partners to participate in the firm's 
management. Usually these management rights stipulate an entitlement 
to be kept apprised of the firm's activities and financial status, to be 
consulted on relatively normal course changes, and to be able to vote 
directly, often on the basis of supra-majority voting rules, on significant 
changes. Partnership status also includes a right to share in whatever 
income remains at the end of an accounting period after all fixed claim- 
ants have been paid. In this respect, partners are the residual claimants 
upon the firm's income stream; that is, they can withdraw funds from the 
partnership only after all fixed claims have been paid. The actual level of 
participation among lawyers varies from firm to firm depending on the 
criteria used in the compensation calculus. Some firms employ a lockstep 
system whereby all lawyers at the same level of seniority earn the same 
income, whereas most other firms rely on a more complex, non-
mechanistic sharing system that includes attention to seniority, to 
marginal productivity, and to efforts at firm promotion and develop- 
ment.' The final characteristic of partnership is more secure, often 
lifetime, tenure. Although the constitution of most firms stipulates that 
partners can be removed from the partnership without causing the entire 
partnership to dissolve, such action occurs only rarely and is accom- 
panied by extensive procedural protection for the departing partner. 
Although, for the most part, partners in the modern corporate law 
firm are all lawyers, not all lawyers in the firm are partners. Until 
recently, most firms were organized around a two-tiered hierarchy of 
partners and associate^.^ Associate lawyers are typically recruited directly 
8 Examples of lockstep firms are Clifford, Chance in Britain and Cravath, Swaine, 
and Moore in New York City. For a hr ther  discussion on the systems available 
to compensate partners and the incentives each create, see R. Gilson and R. 
Mnmkin 'Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Enquiry into 
Corporate Law Firms and How Partners Split Profits' (1985) 37 Stan.LR 313. 
9 	Traditionally, Canadian law firms have relied on a third tier in the cog of the firm 
machinery: apprentice or articling students. Upon graduation from law school, 
students will be hired for a one-year apprenticeship period with a law firm. 
Although the student provides valuable services for the firm during this period, the 
principal purpose of the articling is to allow the firm to determine whether the 
student should be invited at the end of the year to rejoin the firm as an associate 
lawyer. On average, most firms will hire back 50 per cent of the students as 
associate lawyers. 
from law school and hired on the basis of fixed salaries, employment at 
will, and commitments on the part of the firm to furnish some on-the- 
job training and to consider the associate for promotion to partner after 
a fixed interval of from five to ten years.'' In return, the lawyer agrees 
to furnish legal services to clients under the supervision and guidance of 
the firm's partners. The level of partner oversight diminishes quickly as 
the newly minted lawyer establishes her competence. Indeed, well before 
they are promoted to partnership, most associate lawyers will enjoy 
substantial control over small and medium-sized transactions and will 
have had extensive client contact, perhaps even to the point of serving as 
the lawyer responsible for coordinating all of a particular client's needs 
within the firm. The extensive period of time a lawyer serves as an 
associate with a firm provides partners with an abundance of information 
upon which to base a decision regarding promotion to partnership. 
Obviously, the more elaborate the set of actual observations of associates 
under a variety of conditions, the more confident partners can be about 
promotion. Given the defects in the market for human capital, internal 
recruitment and promotion is the principal mechanism for filling the 
firm's labour needs. 
11 The theory of thefirm and the legal partnership 
k THE  THEORY OF THE  FIRM 
The theory of the firm, as propounded by Coase and others," is focused 
on the issue of when the gains from joint economic activity will be 
extracted through discrete market interactions, that is, simple contracts, 
and when they will be generated internally through the firm.12 According 
10 For a full explication of this relationship, see A. Leibowitz and R. Tollison 'Earning 
and Learning in Law Firms' (1978) 7 J. Lgal  Studies 65. Under the 'up or  out 
system' that is used by most corporate law firms in determining promotion to 
partnership, associate lawyers not recruited to partnership are expected to seek out 
other employment, invariably in a smaller, less prestigious firm or in the in-house 
counsel department of a corporate client. The rationale for the 'up or  out system' 
is described by R. Gilson and R. Mnookin 'Coming of Age in a Corporate Law 
Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns' (1989) 41 Stan. LR 567. 
11 R. Coase T h e  Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Eco~wmica386. Reprinted in G.J. Stigler 
and K.E. Boulding (eds) Readings in Price Theoty (Homewood. Ill.: Richard D. Irwin 
1952). 
12 Take, for example, the production of a modern automobile. Under the rather 
implausible assumption that only market transactions will be used to coordinate 
the production of the automobile, a manufacturer would have to enter into a wide 
range of contractual arrangements to produce a single product. These would 
include discrete contracts for the supply of various intermediate goods, for the 
performance of various piecemeal tasks along the assembly line, for the provision 
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to Coase, the answer to this inquiry is supplied by a careful weighing of 
the costs and benefits of both forms of organization. Simply put, as the 
size of the firm increases, its advantages over markets, in terms of savings 
in search costs ('discovering what the relevant costs are'), negotiation and 
contracting costs, and sundry enforcement costs, are eclipsed by the 
accrual of costs emanating from decreasing returns to the entrepreneurial 
function, increasing potential for entrepreneurial mistakes in making 
resource allocation decisions, and the inherent cost advantages of small- 
scale production. 
By and large, subsequent scholars have remained faithful to the basic 
inquiry framed by Coase, that is, analyzing the firm in terms of its market 
alternative, but have differed in their identification of and emphasis upon 
other costs and benefits of the firm form. For instance, while some 
scholars have focused on the ability of the firm's centralized monitoring 
system to control internal agency cost^,'^ others have emphasized the 
salutary effects of the firm's ownership structure," while still others have 
of various marketing and promotional activities, for the transportation of finished 
products to distributors and retailers, and for the provision of post-purchase 
product support. Were an automobile produced in such a manner, it is clear that 
the costs of manufacture would clearly be prohibitive. Far more efficient is a 
production scheme in which the performance of various routine functions are 
internalized within the firm. 
13 Alchian and Demsetz concentrated on the role that the firm plays in monitoring 
the performance of members of the team production function. According to these 
commentators, the value of the firm lies in its ability to achieve economies in 
monitoring the inputs of factors into the production process when it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to ascertain the ex post marginal productivity of individuals involved 
in joint production by measuring their individual output. Monitoring is an 
important function owing to the natural propensity of employees to behave oppor- 
tunistically by refusing to expend their maximum efforts in carrying out economic 
activity within the firm. Opportunism can take the form of 'shirking' (consuming 
more leisure than if one were forced to bear its costs) and 'perquisite consumption' 
(consuming resources that enhance the personal utility of the employee at the ex- 
pense of the firm). Increasing firm growth strains the capacity of the firm to detect 
such conduct, leading to a commensurate increase in the attractiveness of market 
contracting - despite its attendant costs. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz 'Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization' (1972) Am. Econ. Rev. 777. 
14 	Fama and Jensen, for instance, postulate that the efficacy of monitoring by residual 
claimants (the persons bearing the risk that the flow of future receipts paid tn the 
firm will be less than the promised payments to various agents of the firm) informs 
the nature of the internal structure of the firm. Particularly, Fama and Jensen 
argue that for small, relatively simple forms of production, the firm will be 
structured so that the residual claimants are also the managers of the firm. By 
virtue of the fact that the residual claimants' returns are a function of their capacity 
to control internal opportunism, these individuals will have the incentive to manage 
the firm effectively. However, as the scale and complexity of production increases, 
thereby increasing the necessity both for specialized provision of capital and for 
devoted considerable attention to the capacity of the firm's internal 
governance system to overcome innate opportunism problems accom- 
panying asset-specific investment.I5 Strands of all of these theories can be 
found in the many rationales that have been developed to explain the 
survival value of the legal partnership. 
B. THE THEORY OF THE LAW FIRM 
Following the structure of the inquiry established by Coase, the rationale 
for the legal partnership can be explicated best by considering first the 
particular benefits that can be derived from joint production in the 
context of legal services, and second, the features of the law firm 
partnership that make it a superior vehicle to markets in realizing these 
benefits.16In terms of the former question, four principal benefits accrue 
from joint production of legal services. The first relates to the benefits of 
task specialization. By parcelling out parts of a legal transaction to 
different lawyers on the basis of their relative expertise, the overall 
quality of legal advice tendered to a client can be expected to increase. 
This quality advantage is due to the growing complexity of law in 
specialized management, the ability of individuals to perform both tasks competently 
is diminished. As a consequence, a variety of institutionalized monitoring 
arrangements must be relied on to ensure that the conduct of decision-makers is 
aligned with the objectives of residual claimants. On the basis of this core intuition, 
Fama and Jensen reflect on the nature of internal governance mechanisms that are 
used to organize production in organizations as diverse as the conventional 
corporation and the Catholic Church. E. Fama and M. Jensen 'Separation of 
Ownership and Control' (1983) 26 J. Law W Econ. 301; 'Agency Problems and 
Residual Claims' ibid. 327. 
15 Oliver Williamson emphasizes the role that the firm, as a quintessential govern- 
ance mechanism, can play in controlling opportunism of a special kind, that is, 
opportunism involving exploitation of bargaining power that arises from invest- 
ments in asset-specific goods. Such goods are characterized by their customization 
for specific applications, and by the fact that their value in their next-best use is 
considerably less than the use for which they were originally designed. One way 
of overcoming the perverse incentives emanating from asset-specific investments is 
to internalize production in the firm. When both parties to a transaction are 
employed by the same firm, the revenues accruing from their economic activity 
will be aggregated in the same pool. As a consequence of earnings integration, 
neither of the parties will have an incentive to engage in strategic gaming of the 
other. Any redistributional benefit that one party extracts from the other will accrue 
back to both through each party's share in the overall returns to the firm. 
Supplementing the effect of common ownership in correcting perverse incentives, 
the firm's internal governance mechanism is also able to create an apparatus that 
can fairly and expeditiously resolve disputes among parties involved in the firm's 
joint production. See 0.Williamson The Ecommic Institutions of Capitolism (New York: 
Free Press 1985). 
16 	A much more expansive discussion of these issues can be found in R.J. Daniels 
'The Law Firm as an Efficient Community' (1992) 37 McGiU LJ 801. 
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modern society, which undermines the capacity of the generalist to keep 
abreast of legal developments in a way that an individual can who devotes 
all her effort and energy to law in one focused area. The second benefit 
is the realization of economies of scale that result fiom spreading the 
costs of certain fixed inputs, such as libraries, accounting, time-recording, 
data collection, and word-processing facilities, over a greater number of 
lawyers. The third benefit - economies of scope - is derived from joint 
production of complementary goods. These savings are based on the 
ability of team production of legal services to recycle fixed investments in 
human capital, enabling, for instance, a group of lawyers who have 
already serviced a client's needs in a particular area to provide additional 
services at lower cost than can a competitor who has not had previous 
exposure to the client. The fourth, and final, benefit ofjoint production 
of legal services accrues from the diversification of investments in human 
capital that can be realized when team production of legal services is 
coupled with a pooling of earnings." Given the dramatic fluctuations in 
the earnings of lawyers corresponding to changes in underlying economic 
conditions, lawyers may form teams drawn from diverse specialties, each 
specialty being characterized by a different, perhaps even negatively 
correlated, elasticity of demand to changes in gross domestic product. 
Given these benefits, what comparative advantage does the firm have 
over markets in facilitating their realization? By and large, most of the 
theories advanced to explain the advantages of the law firm emphasize 
the role that it can play in controlling the agency costs that arise naturally 
when production of legal services is highly decentralized. Although a 
variety of independent theories have been advanced to illuminate this 
rationale, given the amenability of agency costs to control through 
multiple, overlapping instruments, the most realistic conception of the 
law firm is probably best obtained through some combination of different 
instruments. These include: (1) centralized monitoring through mechan- 
ized time-keeping systems that enable the firm to confer compensation 
on lawyers that is commensurate with their level of effort (as measured 
in hours worked);l8 (2) conferral of ownership interests in the residual 
profit of the firm that can vary from accounting period to accounting 
period on the basis of marginal productivity;lg (3) the role of the firm 
(particularly firm culture) in creating and maintaining commitments to 
17 Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8. 326 
18 F. McChesney 'Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law Firms: 
An Alternative Hypothesis' (1982) 11 J. Lcgal Studies 379 
19 Alchian and Demsetz, supra note IS, 786. Fama and Jensen 'Separation of 
Ownership and Control' supra note 14, 315-7. 
communitarian values that reduce agency costs;P0 and (4) the role of the 
firm's reputational capital and governance structure in ameliorating the 
opportunism spawned by asset-specific investments?' 
1x1 Tho phenomenon of rapid law firmgrowth 
k INTRODUCTION 
Rapid law firm growth is a phenomenon that has been identified in many 
industrialized economies, and Canada is no exception. Of the 48 largest 
Canadian law firms in 1990, none had more than 100 lawyers in 1962 or  
and in 1980, only one firm had more than 100 lawyers; but by the end 
of 1989, 19 firms had more than 100.22 The significance of this growth is 
buttressed by comparing the growth rates of the law firms (as measured 
by the number of lawyers employed) with the number of lawyers in 
private practice in the corresponding provinces. These data are set out 
in table 1, and cover three roughly equal periods from 1962 to 1989. 
Although yielding equivocal results for the first two periods,PS the data 
are arresting for the most recent period: from 1980 to 1989, save for 
Nova Scotia, the growth rate of corporate law firms was far in excess of 
the growth rate of lawyers generally. The difference in the rates ranged 
from a multiple of 1.7 for British Columbia to a multiple of 3.5 for 
Quebec. Similar trends have been exhibited in the United States?' 
Galanter and Palay have analyzed the pattern of law firm growth in 
the United States, and have found that a kinked exponential function is 
20 Daniels, supra note 16 
21 Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8, 367. Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, 775-80 
22 These figures are based on data from C a d  Law Lirt (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 
published annually). The sample of 48 firms was constructed by identifying the 
largest law firms in five Canadian aties (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, 
and Halifax) in 1990, and following the number of lawyers back to 1962. 
23 In some cases, the growth rate of firms was considerably greater than the total 
number of lawyers; in other cases, the opposite relationship was found. 
24 In the United States, for instance, the Nationnl Luw Journal (18 September 1989) has 
reported that the number of firms with more than 150 lawyers has increased from 
5 in 1970 to 202 in 1989. Of those 202 firms in 1989, 13 had over 500 lawyers, 
and 3 had more than 1,000. Further statistics are provided by Gilson and Mnookin, 
supra note 8, 314 n3. Rapid growth in the number of American lawyers is 
considered by R. Sander and E. Douglass Williams 'Why Are There So Many 
lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market' (1989) 14 Law W Social Inquirg 431; 
and R Nelson 'Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large 
law Firms' (1981) Am. Bar Found. f is .  J. 95. The issue of why the 'mega' law firm 
has not developed in the United Kingdom is examined in J. Flood 'Megalaw in 
the U.K.: Professionalism or Corporatism? A Preliminary Report' (1989) 64 Indiana 
LJ 569. 
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TABLE 1 
Rates of growth of lawyers in major law firms compared with rates of growth of lawyers 
in private practice in the corresponding provinces 
Province 	 1962 1972 1980 1989 
British Columbia 
Lawyers in 12 Vancouver firms 
% growth in firms 
Total lawyers in province 
% growth in province 
Albelta 
Lawyers in 7 Calgary firms 
% growth in firms 
Total lawyers in province 
% growth in province 
Ontario 
Lawyers in 15 Toronto firms 
% growth in firms 
Total lawyers in province 
% growth in province 
Quebec 

Lawyers in 11 Montreal firms 
% growth in firms 
Total lawyers in province 
% growth in province 
Nova Scotia 
Lawyers in 3 Halifax firms 

% growth in firms 

Total lawyers in province 330 40 1 903 1,586 

% growth in province d a  21.5 125.2 75.6 

a The 48 law firms from 5 major cities chosen for the sample were the largest in each city 

in 1990. 

Sources: D . k k  Stager Lawyers in C a d  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990) at 

146; C a d  Law List (Toronto: Canada Law Book,published annually). 

best fitted with the data ~ollected.'~ This exponential function has, they 
argue, been operative since 1922, indicating that the size of the large 
American firms grew by a constant or increasing percentage each year. 
25 	 Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, 756-65. A kinked exponential hnction means 
that law firms grew exponentially before and after 1970, but at different rates. 
According to the researchers, endogenous factors explain steady exponential growth, 
while exogenous factors explain the increases in the 1970 growth rates. 
Canadian law firm growth patterns seem to parallel the American trends. 
Although having some anomalous years, the trend in the Canadian data 
presented in graph 1, which measures law firm growth in terms of the 
aggregate number of partners and associates in 48 firms, shows that 
Canadian law firms grew by constant or  increasing rates from 1960 to 
1990, indicating that similar forces are at ~ l a y . 5 ~  
A second but equally distinctive feature of law firm growth in the last 
decade has been its geographical scope. Galanter has commented on the 
propensity of large American corporate law firms to grow by opening 
offices in cities other than where the firm was originally based: 
Twenty years ago the occasional Washington or foreign branch office seemed 
anomalous ... But in 1979 of  the twenty largest firms, nineteen had offices in 
more than one city ... The mean number of city locations of the twenty largest 
firms was five. Of these fifteen had at least one branch overseas?' 
Although occurring somewhat later than the trends reported in the 
United States, Canadian law firms have also demonstrated growing 
geographical dispersion. Tables 2 and 3 depict the frequency with which 
offices have been opened in locations outside the city in which the firm 
is headquartered. Table 2 lists the new offices of firms opened in other 
Canadian cities, and table 3 lists the new offices opened in foreign cities.28 
These data exclude mergers of existing firms.29 Although the openings 
reported in table 2 do not appear significant, the openings shown in 
table 3, especially for the last five years, are dramatic: within the last five 
years, 14 Canadian firms have opened 18 foreign offices. This compares 
with a total of six openings in the 20 years prior to 1985. 
In view of the rather pronounced trends observed in law firm growth 
- exponential increases in size and recent multi-jurisdictional openings 
- any theory of growth must explain both factors. Galanter and Palay 
have attempted to explain the former, though not the latter. They argue 
that exponential law firm growth can be attributed to the pressures 
26 Robust growth is exhibited most starkly by Toronto firms in the last decade; in 7 
of the 10 years in the period 1980 to 1990, Toronto law firms grew in excess of 
8 per cent per year. For 6 out of 10 Vancouver firms and 5 out of 10 Montreal 
firms, comparable growth rates were exhibited. 
27 Galanter, supra note 4, 155. See also S. Labaton 'U.S. Law Firms Expand to Reach 
Global Clientele' The New York Times 12 May 1988. 
28 These data were obtained from a series of newspaper and periodical searches and 
were supplemented, where possible, with information obtained from our 
interviewing process. 
29 This issue is dealt with extensively in section v below. 
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TABLE 2 
New domestic offices 
Date Firm 
Stikeman Elliot 
McMaster Meighen 
Martineau Walker 
Stikeman Elliot 
Ogilvy Renault 
Byers Casgrain 
Bennett Jones 
Bennett Jones 
Stikeman Elliot 
TABLE 3 
New foreian offices 
Date Firm 
Phillips & Vineberg 
Stikeman Elliot 
Phillips & Vineberg 
Stikeman Elliot 
Burnett Duckworth 
McMaster Meighen 
Stikeman Elliot 
Phillips & Vineberg 
Bull Housser & Tupper 
Blake Cassels & Graydon 
Ogilvy Renault 
Fasken Martineau Walker 
Bull Housser & Tupper 
Smith Lyons 
McCarthy & McCarthy 
Perley-Robertson Panet 
Hill & McDougall 
Bull Housser & Tupper 
Davies Ward & Beck 
Faskin Martineau Walker 
Bennett Jones 
Ladner Downs 
Lawson Lundell 
Lawson Lundell 
MacLeod Dixon 
'	Closed in 1988 
Liaison office 
Head office 
Montreal 

Montreal 

Montreal 

Montreal 

Montreal 

Montreal 

Calgary 

Calgary 

Montreal 

Head office 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Calgary 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Vancouver 
Toronto 
Montreal 
Toronto and Montreal 
Vancouver 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Ottawa 
Vancouver 
Toronto 
Toronto and Montreal 
C a b r y
Vancouver 
Vancouver 
Vancouver 
Calgary 
New office location 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Ottawa 
Ottawa 
Ottawa 
Saskatoon 
Ottawa 
Vancouver 
New office location 
Paris 

London 

Hong Kong 

Hong Kong 

London' 

London 

New York 

New York 

Shanghai 

London 

Paris 

London 

Hong Kong 

Hong on^^ 
London. England 
Washington, DC 
Taipei 
London, England 
Brussels 
Taipei 
Hong Kong 
Taipei 
Hong Kong 
Moscow 
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produced by the 'promotion to partnership tournament.' They claim that 
the promotion of associates to partner status, combined with the desire 
of lawyers at partner level to fully exploit their surplus capital, requires 
an exponential increase in the size of the firm.50 That is, as associates are 
promoted, new associates must be hired to fill their positions so that the 
surplus capital of senior lawyers continues to be fully leveraged. Thus, so 
long as the ratio of partners to associates is kept constant, promotion of 
associates to partner status, which is deemed by the researchers to be a 
proxy for the attainment of sufficient human capital to create a surplus, 
will dictate an exponential increase in the size of the firm. 
Apart from their failure to explain the recent pattern of multi- 
locational growth, Galanter and Palay's work suffers from two other 
defects. First, by focusing principally on supply-side factors, the argument 
neglects unduly the central role of demand-side factors in both stimulat- 
ing and constraining law firm growth. Despite the desire of lawyers to 
leverage fully their human capital, it is clear that they will not be able to 
do so in a way that is impervious to market constraints. Should a firm's 
client base be affected by a cyclical downturn in the economy or by an 
unanticipated adverse shift in consumer preferences, the demand for that 
firm's services will, not surprisingly, contract. In this scenario, irrespective 
of the leveraging objectives of the firm's partners, only egregious folly 
would cause the firm to undertake rapid expansion in an environment 
of enervated demand. 
A second difficulty with the promotion to partnership analysis turns 
on its inability to explain much of the recent merger activity that has oc- 
curred among mature law firms in the United States and Canada.=' With 
partnership ratios roughly consistent across law firms of similar size, 
growth through merger would not appear to confer significant leveraging 
gains. Simply stated, a firm of 100 partners and 200 associates will not 
experience any gains from a merger with a firm of 50 partners and 100 
associates; prior to the merger, the two firms each had a ratio of two 
associates for every partner, and this ratio will remain unchanged by the 
merger. Unless the ex ante associate-to-partner ratios of merging firms 
differ substantially, there is no incentive for firms concerned with under- 
exploited surplus partner reputational capital to engage in this beha- 
viour. 
A more rigorous approach to understanding the causes of law firm 
growth is predicated on the rather straightforward assumption that 
30 Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, 771 

31 This increase in merger and affiliation activity is discussed in section v below. 

growth is a function of both demand- and supply-side factors. That is, law 
firm growth will occur in response to the changing demand for jointly 
produced legal services. If, however, as a result of certain exogenous 
changes, the law firm can realize certain economies that increase its cost 
effectiveness in the delivery of legal services, then the increase can be 
expected to stimulate law firm growth. Consistent with this claim, the 
discussion following will first consider the demand-side factors and then 
the supply-side factors influencing corporate law firm growth. 
B. THE DEMAND FOR CORPORATE LAW SERVICES 
Over the last decade, the demand for corporate law services has under- 
gone sweeping change. The most notable change in demand has been its 
increasing intensity, which has required firms to expand the scale of their 
operations. However, at the same time that the intensity of demand has 
increased, it has also become much more volatile. The factors underlying 
the changes in demand for corporate legal services include: robust 
economic growth, growing levels of government intervention, inter- 
nationalization of the domestic economy, and increased legalization of 
corporate activity. Each of these factors will be addressed in turn. 
I. Real economic growth 
A primary source for increased demand for legal services emanates from 
exogenous macroeconomic growth pressures.J2 As the economy expands, 
an increase in demand for corporate law services can be expected to 
follow. For instance, during a period of economic growth and prosperity, 
corporations will have greater need for capital to invest in the expansion 
of their existing activities. The corporate finance departments of the large 
law firms will provide advice and assistance to clients as they try to fund 
new projects. While the degree of involvement of the lawyer will vary in 
accordance with the form of capital raised (generally greatest with public 
equity issues, smallest with respect to routine bank loans), it is clear that 
these transactions will increase demand for legal services. And, once the 
capital is raised, clients will require further legal assistance in funnelling 
the new funds into established or new ventures. Again, the services of the 
corporate lawyer, in incorporating new companies and in drafting joint- 
32 	Support for this proposition can be taken from studies of the American legal 
profession. See B.P. Pashigian 'The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the 
Demand for and Supply of Lawyers' (1977) 20 J. Law U Econ. 53. Pashigian found 
that the quantity of legal services demanded was positively correlated with the level 
of gross national product. His proxy for demand was the number of lawyers in 
active practice. 
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venture, licensing, and franchising agreements, will be required. Once 
the economy slackens, and pessimism sinks in, clients will be understand- 
ably reluctant to embark on these initiatives, and the demand for cor- 
porate law services, with the exception of insolvency and receivership 
specialties, will fall off. 
Table 4 compares real provincial GDP data with the growth of law 
firms in five cities, providing strong support for the putative correla- 
tion between growth in demand for legal services as reflected in firm size 
and general economic growth. When, as in the post-1981 recession 
period, the economies of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia 
experienced robust economic growth, law firms located in these provinces 
experienced rates of increase that, in most years, matched or exceeded 
the real rate of growth in GDP. 
2. Growing levels of government inmention 
Another factor that has stimulated the demand for corporate law services 
is the incremental growth of government intervention in the economies 
of Western industrialized nations ever since the inauguration of the New 
Deal and the rise of the bureaucratic welfare state." Although it can be 
argued that the recent deregulatory wave unleashed by the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations in the United States and Great Britain, respec- 
tively, may have curtailed the growth of government intervention, there 
are strong reasons for believing that the depth of government interven- 
tion may not have been constrained, only its targets." In this respect, 
increasing levels of government intervention imply an increase in the 
range and depth of laws that affect on the activities of the corporate 
sector. As the scope for law increases, the necessity of utilizing the 
assistance of legal advisors to respond to these laws heightens. 
The importance of legal advice in counselling corporate clients is 
accentuated when the reliance of government regulators on 'quasi-law' 
is acknowledged.'' In the absence of legislative deliberation and adoption, 
the task of identifying the rules surrounding a contemplated course of 
33 Interestingly, however, Pashigian's study led him to conclude that the scale of 
government regulation was not positively correlated with demand for legal services. 
Ibid. 73 
34 R. Howse, J.R.S. Prichard, and M.J. Trebilcock 'Smaller or Smarter Government?' 
(1990) 40 UTLJ 498. 
35 The role of administrative quasi-legislation is discussed by R. Megarry 'Administra- 
tive Quasi-Legislation' (1944) 60 Law QR 125. For a recent discussion of the role 
of quasi-law in the Canadian securities context. see H. Janisch 'Reregulating the 
Regulator: Administrative Structure of Securities Commissions and Ministerial 
Responsibility' in Securities Law in the Moden  Finann'al Marketplace, Special Lectures 
of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: R. deBoo 1989) 97. 
TABLE 4 
Percentage mowth of lawyers in maior law firmsa compared with percentaKe mowth of CDP in the corresponding provinces 
Province 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bri t i shColumbia~~~growth 0.3 9.4 4.5 4.9 4.3 5.6 5.4 -6.2 3.4 2.1 6.5 1.5 6.4 5.1 5.7 

Vancouverlawfirmgrowth 2.3 6.1 4.9 9.3 1.6 10.4 9.2 12.6 9.2 9.5 9.3 -0.4 5.2 8.0 7.7 

Alberta CDP growth 6.5 7.8 5.8 7.1 9.7 5.2 8.5 -1.8 -0.2 1.6 6.0 -2.3 1.7 6.1 1.7 

Calgary law firm growth -2.0 4.7 9.0 5.9 13.4 13.8 22.9 15.5 13.4 8.1 11.2 6.0 0.6 7.3 3.5 

Ontario CDP growth 0 5.5 3.0 2.3 2.5 0.1 3.2 -3.7 5.3 8.7 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.4 2.8 

Toronto law firm growth 9.2 5.4 0.5 13.5 4.9 7.2 9.3 13.6 7.7 6.1 8.2 10.1 12.4 11.0 11.4 

Quebec GDP growth 1.1 4.9 2.5 2.2 4.5 1.2 2.2 -5.4 2.5 6.9 2.6 2.8 4.8 4.5 2.5 

Montreal law firm growth 9.6 4.5 11.0 2.6 1.5 11.7 8.9 10.4 7.8 8.1 1.1 6.5 5.5 8.9 5.3 

Nova Scotia CDP growth 3.6 2.9 2.9 5.1 1.5 3.1 1.7 -1.6 3.5 7.7 4.9 3.0 0.9 3.0 3.8 
Halifax law firm mowth 12.1 3.1 7.5 2.8 1.4 6.7 8.8 5.8 8.7 8.0 4.6 2.7 6.0 4.1 1.6 
a Number of lawyers in sample of 48 firms (see table 1) 

Sources: GDP data (constant 1986 dollars) obtained from Conference Board of Canada: Online Data. Law firm information derived from data 

collected from Canada Law LA (Toronto: Canada Law Book, published annually). 
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conduct becomes parlous. To clarify what the law is in this setting 
necessitates an inquiry that is much more searching and expensive than 
would be required in a regime where law is confined to what is technical- 
ly on the statute books. As Galanter has noted, '[Clorporate client and 
mega-lawyer come together in a setting in which there is an immense 
proliferation of law and at the same time an increasing awareness of its 
indeterminate and problematic character.IS6 
3. Zntmnationalizcltion of the domestic economy 
A third source stimulating demand for the services of corporate law firms 
emanates from changes in the nature of activity occurring in the 
corporate sector that are independent of macroeconomic growth cycles. 
In large part, these changes reflect the growing 'internationalization' of 
the domestic economy. This internationalization is a result of an 
unparalleled degree of cooperation effected among the industrial states 
during the post-Second World War era. The fruits of this cooperation 
are reflected in the diminution of the strength of the various barriers that 
have traditionally worked to impede the flow of goods and capital across 
international boundaries. For instance, during the period 1947 to 1987, 
the worldwide average tariff rates on manufactured goods fell from 40 
per cent to between 5 and 6 per cent.s7 This has resulted in dramatic 
increases in trade. Trebilcock reports that in Canada's case alone, the 
level of exports and imports has grown by 564.5 per cent and 552.3 per 
cent, respectively, in the period 1947 to 1986.58 In the light of the 
impending completion of the European internal market, the execution 
of the staged implementation of the Canada-United States free trade 
agreement and its extension to Mexico, and the revival and integration 
of Central and Eastern European countries into the world trading order, 
it is possible that the amount of international trade will continue to 
expand dramatically within the next decade. 
Another barometer of the growing levels of internationalization can be 
found in the spectacular increases in international capital flows that have 
been observed in the last two decades. The Economic Council of Canada 
has found that cross-border trade in existing securities increased 2 1 times 
between 1977 and 1988.59 Further, the funds raised in international bond 
36 Galanter, supra note 4, 161 
37 Managing Adjurtmenl: Policies f w  Trade-Senritive Industries (Ottawa: Economic Council 
of Canada 1988) 1 
38 Michael J. Trebilcock 'Freedom of Contract' (draft manuscript on file with the 
author) 
39 New Frontiers: Intnnalionoliration of Finunciol Marketi (Ottawa: Economic Council of 
Canada 1989) 5 
markets by all countries were 6 times the amount raised in 1980?O These 
trends were also manifested in the amount of international banking 
activity. Bryant has reported, for example, that during the 2 1 year period 
between 1964 and 1985, international banking activity grew twice as fast 
as trade in goods.41 
These trends can be presumed to have had important stimulative 
effects on the demand for legal services. First, tethered to the relationship 
noted earlier between economic expansion and demand for legal services, 
liberalization of trade and capital barriers will, in accordance with the 
dictates of Riccardian trade theory, be translated into increased economic 
growth, which will in turn stimulate demand for legal services. Second, 
by definition, the effectuation of economic activity across jurisdictional 
boundaries involves greater legal complexity than if the activity were 
confined to a domestic context. Corporate actors will not, especially in 
discrete, one-time relationships, be familiar with the rights and obliga- 
tions they have when undertaking conventional commercial activity across 
jurisdictions. Mitigation of this uncertainty can be achieved by soliciting 
legal advice in the clients' home jurisdiction. 
A third effect of internationalization has been the increasing amount 
of rationalization activity that it has spurred. In an effort to ready 
themselves for more intense international competition, large established 
corporations have engaged in a wide range of strategic activities, mani- 
fested most clearly in the accelerating amount of merger and acquisition 
activity undertaken by Canadian and American corporations in the last 
ten years. For instance, Demott reports that in 1985, us firms committed 
to 30 merger transactions involving values in excess of $1 billion. In 
contrast, she found that only 12 merger-related transactions valued at $1 
billion or more took place in the United States between 1969 and 1980.4' 
She reports that merger activity has also heightened in Canada in the 
same peri0d.4~ This claim is confirmed by the data presented in graph 2. 
By plotting, against different vertical axes, the number of merger and 
acquisition transactions occurring in Canada and the United States be- 
tween 1960 and 1990, a clear upward trend can be observed. At least 
part of the rise in merger activity can be correlated with the increasing 
impact of internationalization. If not motivated by the attempt to create 
and exploit market power, merger and acquisition activity allows cor- 
40 Ibid. 
41 R.C. Bryant In$emdionol Financial Intnmedialion (Washington: Brookings Institute 
1987) 20-1 
42 See, e.g., D. Demott 'Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation' (1987) 65 
Wash. U. LQ 69 at 80. 
43 Ibid. 81 
- - 
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GRAPH 2 
Mergers and aquisitions (number of deals) in Canada and the United States 
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Sources: Mergers and Acquicitions J o u d  and Bureau Merger Register 
porations to exploit certain synergies and efficiencies of scale and scope 
in the production of goods, thereby conferring tangible benefits on 
consumers." 
These transactions have exerted a profound effect on the nature of 
legal services provided in Canada and the United States. Because of the 
size of the stakes and the level of complexity involved in merger and 
acquisition transactions, any increase in their frequency will increase the 
prospect for costly and protracted legal disputes in a wide range of legal 
areas. The increasing likelihood of entanglements with the legal system 
will, in turn, increase the demand for an extensive array of legal services. 
For instance, a given merger or acquisition transaction, whether 
motivated by strategic or financial objectives, may require legal expertise 
in areas as diverse as securities, tax, antitrust, bankruptcy, labour, 
commercial litigation, and intellectual property. In order to economize 
on coordination costs, these transactions are best run out of a single law 
44 	For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see R.J.Daniels 'Don't Shoot the 
Messenger: Mergers and Acquisitions and the Public Interest' in L. Waverman (ed.) 
Corporate Globolizalion Through Mergers and Acqukilions (Calgary: University of Calgary 
Press 1991) 195. 
firm. In this vein, merger and acquisition transactions, as well as 
increasing the overall demand for legal services, have also affected the 
nature of this demand in the direction of multi-specialty providers of 
legal service^.'^ 
4. The Legaliration of corporate activity 
A final factor exerting an impact on the demand for corporate legal 
services is the legalization of corporate activity. While this trend is 
partially reflective of the burgeoning level of governmental regulation in 
the economy, it is also reflective of two somewhat related trends: (1) 
growing private sector litigiousness; and (2) increased reliance on in- 
house counsel. The first factor, growing litigiousness, has been the subject 
of considerable scholarly investigation over the past decade?6 For the 
most part, this litigiousness has been observed in the context of tradition- 
al tort law areas, such as medical malpractice, product liability, motor 
vehicle accidents, and embroiling corporations in disputes with various 
consumers, often individuals." Surprisingly, however, recent studies have 
found that private litigiousness in the tort area is now proliferating into 
other areas of law, including conventional commercial and contract law?' 
These findings are significant because they imply that resolution of inter- 
corporate disputes is being remitted to the courts, contravening the con- 
ventional view espoused by Macaulay that businesses rarely rely on strict 
45 	During the course of our interviews, a number of small and medium-sized firms 
admitted being under considerable pressure to grow in order to accommodate the 
demands placed on them by 'mega-transactions.' Without a sufficiently large 
foundation, the law firms had considerable difficulty in staffing the broad teams 
OF lawyers necessary to conduct these transactions. 
46 	See, for instance, D. Hensler 'Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute 
for Civil Justice's Research' (1987) 48 Ohio Stale LJ 479; G. Priest 'Product Liability 
Law and the Accident Rate' in Litan and Winston (eds) Linbilif~:P+ctiue and Pol+ 
(Washington: The Brookings Institute 1988) 184; 'The Current Insurance Crisis 
and Modern Tort Law' (1987) 96 Yalc LJ 1521. 
47 	 For instance, Priest, supra, at 187 found that product liability filings in US courts 
increased from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,595 in 1986 - a more than seven-fold increase. 
The claim that these statistics are suggestive of an increase in litigiousness has not 
gone unchallenged. See M. Galanter 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion' (1986) 
46 Matyland LR 3, who argues that, in view of the relatively small percentage of 
national litigation filed in federal courts (2 per cent), these statistics are unable to 
generate robust predictions respecting national trends. 
48 	Recent work by Marc Galanter and Joel Rodgers has found dramatic increases in 
the amount of contractual litigation: a 223 per cent increase in the number of legal 
disputes between the years 1960 and 1988. The increase is attributed to increased 
complexity of business transactions and increased competition. See their preliminary 
study reported in M. Geyelin 'Feuding Firms Cram Courts, Study Says' Th W d  
Street Journnl 31 December 1990. 
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legal rights and remedies in resolving commercial c~nflicts.'~ This 
increase in both tort and commercial litigiousness has caused senior 
managers to make earlier and more extensive use of legal advice in 
corporate decision-making, which further contributes to the demand for 
corporate legal services. 
The second tictor contributing to the legalization of corporate activity 
has been the rise of in-house legal departments in corporation^.^^ For 
instance, in the United States, the number of in-house counsel is alleged 
to have quadrupled in the twenty-year period between 1962 and 1982P1 
Although robust Canadian data are not available, the data presented in 
Table 5, showing the total number of lawyers employed by 56 corpora- 
tions reported in the Canada Law List for the years 1990, 1980, and 1970, 
indicate a belated but similar expansionary trend occurring in Canada. 
Whereas the total number of lawyers employed by the corporations 
included in the CanadaLaw Zi t  increased by only 6.5 per cent from 1970 
to 1980, in the following decade the number of lawyers increased by 86.3 
per cent. Although the rise of the in-house legal department was 
originally envisaged as a way of allowing corporations to reduce their 
demand for and cost of legal services (by sourcing legal services at 
wholesale rather than retail pricessP and by giving corporations greater 
49 	Indeed, Galanter and Rodgers, supra, found that the number of intercorporate 
contractual disputes increased by 1,112 per cent between 1971 and 1986. The 
classic study on corporate litigation patterns is S. Macaulay 'Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study' (1963) 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55. 
50 	The transformative role of in-house counsel on the nature of legal practice is 
documented in k Chayes and k Chayes 'Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law 
Firm' (1985) 37 Stan. LR 277; J. Freund 'Comment on Chayes and Chayes' (1985) 
37 Stun. LR 301; and R. Rosen 'The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional 
Judgment and Organizational Representation' (1989) 64 Indiana LJ 479. 
51 	J. Aye  'In House Counsel - Better than Ever' Nat. LJ (15 February 1982) at 11. 
Chayes and Chayes, supra, at 277 n l ,  cite a 1983 Arthur Young study of 183 
corporate law departments of varying size that showed an average growth of 29 per 
cent between 1977 and 1982. This growth has resulted in the creation of some very 
large legal departments: according to the Martidah-Hubbell Law Di~eciurvol. 13, 
General Electric's legal department had 347 lawyers in 1990. 
52 	By bringing work in-house, corporations can avoid paying 'retail' prices for types 
of work that in-house counsel could produce at 'wholesale' prices. Typically, the 
more likely it is that an employer can assure in-house counsel a sufficient volume 
of transactions in a given area, the greater the prospect that the lawyer will be able 
to develop the expertise necessary to deliver such services at a standard approximat- 
ing that met by outside counsel. The growing capacity of in-house counsel to meet 
rigorous standards of professional competence is also a function of the increasing 
prestige that is enjoyed by these lawyers, which has enabled outside counsel to 
move to in-house law departments without sustaining any loss in professional 
stature. As Rosen has observed, 'inside counsel at major corporations are no longer 
depicted as second-rate counsel dependent on the guidance of outside counsel. In- 
control over the activities of outside counsel55), things did not turn out as 
expected. Rather than tempering demand, corporate counsel have made 
senior managers more sensitive to and concerned about the potential for 
costly legal entanglements. Insinuation of lawyers into the senior levels 
of corporate decision-making has meant that corporate decisions are 
increasingly being framed in a way that is sensitive to legal as well as 
economic concerns. This framing effect has made managers more anxious 
to cover off any potential legal exposure by soliciting formal legal advice. 
And, because of the inherent difficulties of in-house counsel in servicing 
these needs, possibly because of a perceived lack of expertise or 
independence, a non-trivial portion of the demand they induce will spill 
over to the private bar." 
Nevertheless, in the course of augmenting the demand for corporate 
legal services, reliance on in-house counsel has affected the nature of this 
demand. In particular, growing use of in-house counsel has increased the 
volatility of demand for legal services.55 This increase in volatility is 
attributable to two factors. First, while in-house counsel have enlarged 
side counsel now are characterized as possessing the knowledge and training neces- 
sary to handle complex and important legal matters.' Rosen, supra note 50, 483 
53 	This control is based on the ability of inside counsel to correct some of the endemic 
information asymmetry problems that beset the market for corporate law services. 
Since, irrespective of the amount of work they do, in-house counsel will receive a 
fixed wage from the corporation, they will have little incentive to perform or permit 
to be performed services for which the corporation has little real need. As a 
consequence, in-house counsel can be expected to play a role in controlling 
opportunistic behaviour by outside counsel. By insisting that outside counsel tender 
for certain transactions, by scrutinizing the billings of outside counsel, and by 
reviewing closely the work of outside counsel, in-house counsel can draw on their 
expertise to ensure that the corporation is not overcharged. To the extent that 
information asymmetries have, in the past, allowed outside firms to supply services 
in an amount or at a price that is in excess of what a fully informed consumer 
would desire, the proliferation of in-house counsel can be expected to constrain 
such activity. 
54 	See, for instance, P. Lochner Jr 'Comment (on Chayes and Chayes)' (1985) 37 Stan. 
LR 305 at 311: ' m h e  existence of in-house counsel is, I believe, expanding the 
amount of legal work. Because in-house counsel exist, they observe and become 
involved in many areas. Frequently outside assistance is sought ... In short, inside 
and outside counsel are not fighting over where to split the pie; rather, the pie is 
being expanded by inside counsel to the economic and professional benefit of both.' 
Contra, however, see Chayes and Chayes, supra note 50, 293, who argue that, as 
a result of the rise of in-house counsel, the elite law firm is 'suffering a concomitant 
and drastic narrowing of the range of legal work that it performs for the largest, 
most powerful corporations on the American economic scene.' 
55 	The increased riskiness of law firm income flows is commented on by J. Fitzpatrick 
'Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the Century' 
(1989) 64 Indiana LJ 461 at 464. 
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TABLE 5 
Number of in-house counsel 
Company 
Abitibi Price 
Air Canada 
Alcan Aluminium Ltd. 
Ammo 
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 

Bank of Montreal 

Bank of Nova Scotia 

BCE Inc. 

Bell Canada 

Bombardier 

Canada Post Corporation 

Canada Trust 

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 

Canadian National Railways 

Canadian Pacific Forest Products 

Canadian Pacific Ltd. 

Canadian Pacific Legal Services 

Central Guaranty Trust 

Chevron 

Cominco Ltd. 

Dominion Textile Inc. 

Domtar 

Esso Resources Canada Ltd. 

Federal Business Development Bank 

General Motors 

Great West Life Insurance 

IBM Canada 

Imperial Oil Ltd. 

Imasco Ltd. 

Inco Ltd. 

Insurance Corporation of BC 

MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. 

Manitoba Public Insurance Co. 

Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. 

William Mercer 

Molson Companies Ltd. 

Molson Breweries of Canada Ltd. 

Montreal Trust 

National Bank of Canada 

National Trust 

Noranda Inc. 

Northern Telecom Ltd. 

Ontario Hydro 

Petro Canada Inc. 

Placer Dome Inc. 

Polysar Ltd. 

Royal Bank of Canda 

Royal Trustco Ltd. 
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TABLE 5 continued 
Comvanv 1990 1980 1970 
Soquij 
Stelco Inc. 
Sun Life Insurance Co.of Canada 
ToronteDominion Bank 
Toronto Stock Exchange 
TransCanada Pipelines 
Xerox Canada 
Total companies in sample 56 56 56 
Total in-house counsel in sample 720 455 291 
Total companies with over 10 lawyers 32 24 14 
Total companies listed in Canada l a w  Lict 423 227 213 
Source: Canada l a w  List (Toronto: Canada Law Book, published annually) 
the demand for more complex types of outside legal services (transaction- 
al advice, for example), they have, by doing some of this work them- 
selves, decreased the demand for other, more routine services traditional- 
ly performed by outside counsel.% From the perspective of the law firm, 
the shift in traditional counsel work to in-house counsel is disturbing 
because the demand for this type of work is extremely stable, varying 
only minimally in response to fluctuations in macroeconomic activity. 
Without a stable flow of routine legal work, corporate law firms have 
become more dependent than ever upon transactional work, which is, by 
definition, much more volatile. 
The second way in which establishment of in-house legal departments 
has contributed to demand volatility emanates from the dilution in or, in 
some cases, severance of the mutual reliance relationship that has tradi- 
tionally existed between outside law firms and their clients?' Because of 
the sunk value of investments made by a traditional legal supplier in 
assets specific to a particular client relationship,5" and because these assets 
are a form of intellectual property that is not easily appropriated, clients 
have been historically reluctant to retain different law firms for different 
transactions, as this will force them to bear the costs of familiarizing 
56 This issue is discussed in Chayes and Chayes, supra note 50, 297 and R Nelson 
'Practice and Privilege' supra note 24, 111. 
57 See Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8, 359-60; Nelson, supra note 2, 68. 
58 These assets consist mainly of the stock of knowledge that the firm amasses about 
the client's internal operating structure, business strategy, financial status, and 
personnel. 
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newly appointed firms with their needs. Concern over recurring fami- 
liarization costs acts as a tax on client shopping that effectively bolsters 
the mutual dependence of client and law firm. However, in-house 
counsel, by serving as a data bank that can store and convey information 
respecting the client's background and legal needs to different outside 
counsel, can reduce the magnitude of the exit tax, enabling clients to 
shop around for legal advice on a transaction-by-transaction basis. 
C. THE SUPPLY OF CORPORATE LEGAL SERVICES 
The various demand-side factors enumerated above impact on the law 
firm through the mediating force of supply-side factors. That is, while not 
wishing to understate the impact of consumer demand in shaping the 
nature of the modern law firm, the force of these preferences is 
constrained somewhat by limitations that result from exigencies of the 
technical production function and from the preferences of suppliers 
(lawyers). In this respect, supply-side factors can be viewed as a prism of 
sorts, through which images of the law firm have been sharpened and, 
in some cases, reshaped. 
For the most part, changes in the firm's technical production function 
over the last decade have supported the thrust of those demand-side 
factors that have 'pulled' on the size of the law firm. These supply 
changes have been observed mainly in the form of increased economies 
of scale resulting from innovative new technologies that have allowed 
firms to automate a range of productive activities at much lower cost than 
in the past.59 Conventional automation has enabled the firm to reduce the 
amount of time that secretaries require to type and copy documents, 
enhance the accuracy of internal record- and time-keeping, improve the 
firm's research capacity by virtue of advances in legal data bases, and 
even confer savings on lawyers in the amount of time and effort that 
lawyers must expend on drafting of judicial pleadings and commercial 
agreements because of assistance from 'smart' document precedent 
systems.60 Save for conventional data and word processing systems, most 
of these innovations entail high initial fixed costs that do not vary greatly 
with the number of actual end users. As such, the per lawyer costs of 
these innovations will decline as the number of lawyers in the firm grows, 
pushing up the firm's minimum efficient scale. 
The other supply-side factor - lawyer preferences - has exerted a 
59 See, for instance, E. Warner 'Large Law Firms Moving Toward Automated Office' 
(1984) Cm-wld 21 May 1984, 23. 
60 Smart precedent manipulation systems will actually custom-tailor documents to 
transactions specified by lawyers. 
more equivocal effect on the firm. While some commentators have 
equated increased size with increased returns to senior partners, this 
relationship is not invariably making at least some lawyers doubt 
the strategy of enthusiastically accommodating client demands for 
enhanced size. Focusing simply on bottom line economic considerations, 
one would expect that apprehension over the prospects of rapid growth 
will be exacerbated the greater are concerns respecting increased 
volatility of consumer demand, which, in the event of a precipitous 
change in economic conditions, could leave senior partners in the 
unenviable position of having to support excess capacity (in the form of 
idle administrative staff and associate lawyers) by reducing the size of 
their partnership draw. An alternative, though a more severe measure, 
is for the firm to reduce the size of its obligations to fixed claimants by 
simply laying off or firing administrative staff and associate lawyers. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the instrumental and consumption 
value of the firm's status as a mini-society of sorts, in which commitments 
to collegiality, cooperation, and community are prized, cost savings 
realized through capricious retrenchment may, in the long term, impose 
debilitating costs on the firm.62 Thus, if the firm is to grow in accordance 
with demand-side pressures, other less drastic means must be found to 
protect the firm from exogenous shifts in demand. 
One obvious mechanism for dealing with such risk is, of course, rooted 
in the diversification rationale for the law firm previously discus~ed.~~ 
That is, by entering into new markets, the firm may be able to diversify 
away some of the risk that its human capital will be idled because of 
adverse economic conditions. These new markets can be entered by 
creating new practice areas that are not as sensitive as the firm's existing 
practice to macroeconomic changes.& However, in view of the dearth of 
legal specialties having elasticities of demand that are negatively 
correlated with existing areas of practice, there will be inherent limita- 
tions on the capacity of the firm to diversify away much of the risk of 
future income disruptions generated by increased demand by selective 
expansion. Consequently, other diversification strategies will have to be 
61 While Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, find that increased size is usually 
correlated with increased returns to senior partners, they concede that there are 
contradictory findings to this claim. 
62 These concerns are elaborated on in Daniels, supra note 16. 
63 See text following note 30, supra. 
64 For instance, a firm specializing in securities law could develop a bankruptcy 
practice. Some firms have created these new areas of practice in various non-legal 
specialties, such as policy advice and family mediation services. 
deployed. One such strategy is to diversify the firm into other jurisdic- 
tions having macroeconomic cycles that are not perfectly correlated with 
conditions extant in the home jurisdiction. In this respect, expanding 
firm size and geographic scope may not be coincidental; geographic 
dispersion may be a necessary accompaniment to the enhanced firm size. 
IV T h  instrumentsfor growth 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having canvassed the reasons for law firm growth, I will now consider 
the myriad ways in which law firms can grow. Essentially, the menu of 
instruments that a firm can deploy in achieving law firm growth consists 
of: standard recruitment and promotion, cherry picking, affiliating, and 
merging. A number of different criteria can be invoked to assess the 
efficacy of the instruments, including the impact on growth on the firm's 
ability to control internal agency c0sts,6~ to inculcate and maintain strong 
community identificati~n,~~ to preserve firm reputational capital,6' to 
diversify away the risks of specialized human ~ a p i t a l , ~  and to achieve 
growth in a timely fashion. The first four of these criteria were generated 
from the discussion of the rationale of the law firm developed earlier; the 
65 	As argued earlier, the law firm form is valued principally for its ability to control the 
costs of opportunism that are implicit in arrangements entailing the joint production 
of legal services. Control of costs is particularly difficult given the problems in evalu- 
ating the contribution of workers to services (which are inherently more amorphous 
than physical goods) and the highly decentralized nature of service production. 
66 	As the size of the firm increases beyond some point, the firm will experience serious 
difficulties in maintaining the integrity of its community identity or culture. At one 
level, the loss is deeply felt because community culture is a consumption good that 
has value in itself. At another level, however, this loss is significant because it 
impedes the firm's capacity to control internal agency problems. Cultural erosion 
in the large firm stems from the loss of intimacy and collegiality that often 
accompanies rapid growth. Consider, for example, the difficulties in transmitting 
and maintaining culture in a rapidly growing, 200-person law firm in comparison 
with a slowly growing, relatively stable 10-person law firm. Whereas in the latter 
case, lawyers will share strong, intimate connections with each other that have been 
forged through years, perhaps even decades, of shared professional and personal 
successes and disappointments, in the former case, the rate of entry into the firm 
is far too high, and the underlying size of the firm is far too large, to be able to 
create a reservoir of shared experience dense enough to support the same intensity 
and durability of collegial bonds. See Daniels, supra note 16. 
67 The preservation of firm reputational capital is another key concern of the firm in 
undertaking growth. Uncontrolled growth can dilute investments in firm 
reputational capital, which not only imposes economic losses on firm partners, but 
also undermines the firm's capacity to control agency costs. 
68 The more rapidly the firm grows, especially if growth is concentrated in certain 
areas of expertise, the less equipped the firm is to self-insure against the risks of 
exogenous economic changes. 
last is self-explanatory and is based on pragmatic considerations. In this 
section, I will invoke these criteria in an effort to evaluate the compara- 
tive strengths and defects of the various instruments available to achieve 
law firm growth in local markets. Having done so, I will then consider 
whether or  not the arguments developed in the context of local markets 
need to be modified when growth is examined in a national or  interna- 
tional setting. 
B. THE INSTRUMENTS FOR GROWTH 
1. Standard recruitment and promotion 
Standard recruitment and promotion is the conventional way in which 
law firms achieve growth, and involves direct recruitment of students to 
the law firm from prestige law schools, fbllowed by a closely supervised 
apprenticeship or  associate period lasting several years that culminates in 
promotion of the associate to partnership. The advantage of this 
instrument lies in its capacity to differentiate between those individuals 
whose personal skills, judgment, and strength of character do and do 
not meet the standards of the firm. As soon as it becomes clear that an 
associate is in the latter category, she will usually be asked by the firm to 
resign. Through this weeding out process, the firm is able to concentrate 
its efforts on instilling commitments to the firm's distinctive culture 
among those lawyers most likely to assume partner status. This subtle, 
though somewhat protracted, acculturation process is prized because of 
the support it lends to the firm's role in controlling agency costs and in 
preserving culture and reputational capital. In comparison to other 
instruments, standard recruitment and promotion provides the strongest 
assurance to the principals of the firm that it is promoting the right kind 
of lawyers to partner status. 
Despite the standard recruitment's strengths in identifying the most 
promising lawyers, however, it is not a perfect instrument for growth, 
being plagued principally by its extremely cumbersome nature. Because 
of the difficulties in transforming human capital, and because of the long 
time needed to develop specialist status in a given area, standard 
recruitment requires the firm to anticipate labour needs well into the 
future. As in any probabilistic forecast, there is always the risk that the 
forecast - either through reliance on erroneous information or through 
radical changes in expected future states - will be incorrect.69 This 
69 The standard work in this area is D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds) 
Judgmenf under Uncertuinty: Heuristics and Biuses (New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1982). 
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subjects the firm to the danger that it will have undertaken extensive 
investment in lawyers whose skills do not mesh with market demands at 
the conclusion of their training. 
Another defect with the standard recruitment instrument is its limited 
capacity to respond to the needs of clients in areas of practice where the 
firm lacks existing expertise. While, in the past, clients having long-term, 
stable relationships with firms have been willing to tolerate some amount 
of 'learning by doing,' it is not clear that clients will be as accommodating 
in the future. In large part, this is attributable to the growing role of in- 
house counsel in monitoring law firm behaviour, which has also broad- 
ened the scope for comparison shopping. Client insistence that firms have 
ready-made expertise in a given area means that gaps in the law firm's 
specialized capital will have to be met through other instruments. 
2. 	~ h e n y ' p x k i n ~or lateral hiring 
Cherry picking or lateral hiring, the recruitment of seasoned lawyers 
from other law firms, addresses the defects found in the standard 
recruitment model.'O Unlike the lengthy training periods implicit in the 
standard recruitment model, cherry picking enables law firms to respond 
much more effectively to the vicissitudes of client demands. A firm ex- 
periencing, for example, a surge in the demand for lawyers with specific 
skills can quickly meet these demands by recruiting lawyers directly from 
the legal labour market. But, like standard recruitment, cherry picking 
is not without flaws. In particular, cherry picking requires firms to make 
costly and irrevocable ex ante commitments, such as instant partnership, 
to recruits without having the benefit of full information. While many of 
the observations that are relied upon in the process of lateral hiring are 
fairly accurate predictors of technical legal talent (performance in court 
or in the negotiation and execution of transactions, the quality of law 
review articles, presentations made to professional organizations, law 
school transcripts, and so forth), other observations bearing, for instance, 
on the recruit's honesty, judgment, and collegiality may be much more 
difficult to obtain firsthand, and are therefore subject to error. 
An additional difficulty with cherry picking pertains to the role of law 
firm culture in shaping and solidifying skills and preferences that are 
70 	Lateral recruitment has gained considerable popularity over the past decade as an 
instrument of growth. See Smith 'National Study: Lateral Hiring Continues 
Unabated' (June 1989) 9 Layer Hiring and Training Report 6.  The 1989 survey 
reported on found that more than half of the lawyers promoted to partner in the 
top 500 American law firms were recruited from other firms. A quarter of the 
surveyed firms reported more than half of their associates were hired laterally. 
valued by the firm. Because lateral recruits may not have had the lengthy 
exposure to the firm ethic through the promotion-to-partnership tour- 
nament, there is a significant likelihood that the new recruits will have 
commitments to the firm and its culture that are much less powerful 
than lawyers recruited directly from law school and then promoted 
through the ranks. In these terms, the more reliance that the firm places 
on lateral hiring, the greater the danger that it will be torn asunder by 
divergent visions of its bedrock values. These internal conflicts are 
further exacerbated by the task of integrating lateral hires into the firm 
hierarchy. That is to say, to the extent that lateral recruits are able to 
exploit market power based on unusually strong demand for their spe- 
cialized skills, then this can be expected to be reflected in the provision 
of benefits from the firm that are more generous than those being 
received by other lawyers in the firm having equivalent experience but 
hired through the standard recruitment route. For all of these reasons, 
one would predict that cherry picking would only be relied upon in those 
circumstances where the firm is confident that it can inculcate the 
requisite commitment to firm culture in the new recruits, and where the 
firm's need for specialist strength is acute. 
3. Mergers 
Merging involves the integration of two or more existing firms into a 
single partnership. Mergers can be effected between two relatively equal 
sized firms or between firms of different sizes. Unlike internal growth, 
merging allows the immediate realization of scale and scope economies 
and ensures that client demands are met with alacrity. And, unlike cherry 
picking, merging allows 'acquiring' firms to obtain the expertise of 
'target' lawyers without jeopardizing the acquired firm's investment in 
reputational capital. 
The deficiencies of mergers in a professional setting are, however, 
numerous and have received considerable attention in legal trade 
journals.'' These deficiencies arise from barriers in achieving the quick 
integration of different firms, each of which may have different underly- 
ing styles of practice, internal governance mechanisms, compensation 
schemes, promotional policies, administrative structures, and marketing 
strategies. Integration requires that consensus be achieved on all of these 
issues in a fairly narrow time-frame. Given that the human resources 
71 See, for instance, N. Blodgett 'Anatomy of a Law Firm Merger' (May 1988) Am. Bar 
Assoc. J. 86; W. Bower 'To Merge or Not to Merge' ibid. 94; and L. Collins 'The 
Metamorphosis of Merging' (April 1986) 60 Law Imt. J. 304. 
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literature indicates that these problems are onerous in the context of 
corporate mergers, especially when firms are of relatively equivalent size, 
it can be predicted that these problems will be compounded in law firms, 
especially with the preponderance of consensus-based governance 
mechanisms that implicate more diffused, prolonged, and, often, less 
bold decision-making. 
Another set of difficulties with the merger instrument arises from the 
information problems identified earlier with the lateral recruitment 
device. The problems of ascertaining the productivity, ethical mettle, and 
collegiality of prospective partners and associates are bound to be 
exacerbated in the case of firm mergers, which require firms to evaluate 
a much larger group of prospective partners in a much shorter time- 
frame. Although information problems are mitigated somewhat by the 
willingness of firms to open their financial records to prospective 
partners, the propensity of law firms to allocate income on bases that 
only crudely track current marginal product (resulting, for example, 
from optimal ex ante agreements respecting the temporal distribution of 
income over a lawyer's lifetime72) means that the capacity of payroll data, 
for instance, to cast light on the market performance of future partners 
is dulled." And, of course, even if pre-merger investigation could identify 
non-performing lawyers in the prospective partner, lawyers in partner 
firms may exhibit tied sales properties. That is, owing to the existence of 
various hands tying mechanisms, that is, commitments embedded in firm 
culture, formalized firm approval processes requiring unanimous appro- 
72 	Disjunction between current income and marginal product may give rise to 
opportunism problems upon the completion of a merger. Since divergence between 
current marginal product and income may represent a form of delayed compensa- 
tion (that is, in order to encourage law firms to make sunk investments in legal 
training, lawyers may bond their performance to the firm by taking less than their 
current marginal product in the expectation of obtaining more than their marginal 
product later), certain constituencies within the successor law firm may use the 
opportunity of a merger to renegotiate these compensation agreements. The effect, 
for instance, of a renegotiation of the arrangements that govern compensation in 
the successor firm that results in the alignment of income and product of senior 
lawyers, thereby reducing the draw of senior lawyers, can be seen as a direct wealth 
transfer from senior to junior lawyers. Normally, senior lawyers can be expected to 
quash efforts aimed at diverting their future draw from the firm. Nevertheless, since 
many mergers, by definition, require extensive re-ordering of the affairs of the 
merging firms, including the renegotiation of partnership point distributions, it may 
be more difficult for senior lawyers to constrain such behaviour. 
73 	The 'coarseness' of a firm's compensation system in marrying compensation with 
marginal productivity is discussed in Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8, 348 and 
S.S. Samuelson 'The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons From 
Management Theory' (1990) 51 Ohio Stale LJ 645 at 651. 
val before the merger can proceed, and so forth, firms may present 
themselves to prospective partners on a 'take it or leave it' basis, negating 
opportunities for prospective partners to 'prune deadwood' from the 
ranks of the successor firm prior to the merger. These information and 
tied-sales problems increase the prospect that the reputational capital of 
the preexisting firms will be diluted by the absorption of lawyers from 
merging partners whose work habits and ethical mettle are incompatible 
with their individual standards. 
Even if firms could be confident, however, that lawyers in their 
partner law firms uniformly adhered to minimum standards of profes- 
sional competence, mergers would still jeopardize another component of 
a law firm's capital investment - its client base. Upon the consummation 
of a merger, the new firm will find itself beset by myriad conflicts among 
existing clients, which will require that the new firm sever ties with some 
of the clients of the pre-existing firms. Although it may be argued that 
these conflicts can be resolved through the erection of 'Chinese walls,' it 
is not clear that these mechanisms will satisfy either client expectations or 
technical legal obligations.'' Picking client survivors is bound to involve 
74 Professional regulation provides that lawyers cannot advise or represent both sides 
of a dispute and are barred, unless adequate disclosure has been made and consent 
obtained, from acting where there is likely to be a conflict of interest. (See, for 
example, Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5). 
Conflict of interest rules have recently been considered by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the case of MacDonnld Est& v. Martin [1990] 3 SCR 1235. Martin, the 
appellant, and the respondent estate were involved in ongoing litigation. Early in 
the process, a lawyer had been working on Martin's case at law firm r She later 
joined law firm B, which subsequently merged with law firm C. Law firm C, 
however, also represented the respondent estate, and the appellant applied for an 
order removing the lawyer from law firm c as the respondent's lawyer due to a 
conflict of interest. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously disqualified law 
firm c from acting for the respondent, but the court was split 4-3 on the 
appropriate test to be applied. Sopinka J, writing for three others, developed a test 
that would presume prejudice to the applicant unless the firm (firm C) could show 
'clear and convincing' evidence that measures had been taken to prevent disclosure 
of confidential information from the 'tainted' lawyer to those members of the firm 
who are engaged against her former client. In other words, he would d o w  
'Chinese walls' or 'cones of silence,' but only if these devices are approved by the 
relevant law society. Mere undertakings and affidavits that the 'tainted' lawyer did 
not disclose damaging information are not enough. Cory J, writing for two others, 
developed a stricter test. When a lawyer who had substantial involvement in the 
matter in question joins the firm acting for the opposing party there will be an 
irrebuUablc prcsumptwn that the confidential information has become knowledge to 
the new firm. This strict test was justified as being essential to preserve public 
confidence in the administration of justice. This principle outweighed any concern 
lawyers might have about mobility and the creation of mega-firms. This decision 
could have severe repercussions on mergers and affiliations among law firms in 
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particularly fractious negotiations, especially considering the necessity of 
resolving this issue at the outset of the merger. 
This discussion suggests that the merger instrument will be most 
efficient when there are clear asymmetries in power between merging 
partners prior to the consummation of the merger. In this setting, one 
firm will clearly be dominant and its partners will be able to impose their 
vision on the other firm, in respect of the variables canvassed above, 
without having to engage in the protracted negotiation and consensus- 
building that would be required in the case of mergers involving two 
similarly sized firms. In other words, mergers of asymmetrically sized 
partners imply the absorption of the acquired firm into the dominant 
firm, thereby obviating extensive reconsideration of the firm compact. In 
contrast, mergers of equivalently sized partners imply the creation of a 
new firm from the combined resources of the two pre-existing firms. In 
this case, there is no operative presumption that either of the firm's 
characteristics will 'trump' in creating the arrangements that will govern 
conduct in the successor firm. Consequently, the need for extensive 
negotiation will be increased. Of course, the more compatible firms are 
prior to the merger, the less taxing will be the resolution of many of 
these is~ues.'~ 
4. Affiliations 
Affiliations are a final route to achieving law firm growth and involve the 
effectuation of various strategic linkages between two independent firms. 
The substantive content of such affiliation arrangements can vary widely 
and depends on the degree of integration sought between participating 
firms. On one end of the continuum there are relationships that approxi- 
mate mergers, while at the other end there are relationships that merely 
entail a loose commitment to try to direct work to the other firm in 
situations where client demands cannot be effectively serviced within the 
Canada. See, for example, J. Saunders 'Court Ruling Signals Tough Stance on 
Legal Conflict of Interest' The Glob and Mail Toronto, 1 1  May 1990. For a more 
general discussion of the ethics of conflicts of interest, see M. Kline and D. 
Dougherty 'Avoiding Client Conflicts of Interest in an Era of Corporate Change' 
(1986) 14 Am. Intelledual Propnt)l Law Rrroc. QJ 104; and S. Miller and I. Warren 
'Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and Outside Counsel' (1985) 
40 Bus. huy e r  631. 
75 	For instance, if the firms have sharply different specialties, the synergies to be 
obtained from the merger are increased, while the client conflicts are correspond- 
ingly reduced. 
referring firm.'6 Between the poles of de facto mergers and loose referral 
arrangements are relationships involving more explicit and binding 
commitments to refer work of a particularized nature to firm affiliates. 
The strengths of the affiliation instrument are obvious. By avoiding 
the commitment to full-scale integration, much of the time and expense 
implicit in deployment of the merger instrument can be avoided. This 
makes the device particularly attractive to firms of relatively equal size. 
The defects in growing by affiliation, however, are not trivial. The 
flipside of allowing firms to continue to operate as separate institutions 
is that the incentive to achieve the gains from increasing the size of the 
law firm may be dulled. In the absence of the pooling of receipts, firms 
will be understandably reluctant to share valued firm assets with affiliate 
firms. Consider, for example, the capacity of affiliated firms to ensure 
that work is assigned to individual lawyers solely on the basis of relative 
expertise, not on the basis of firm membership. In a fully integrated firm, 
lawyers will sustain little, if any, financial penalty for referring work to 
other members of the firm. Since a lawyer's income stream is not just a 
function of the hours billed on a particular file, there is no reason for a 
lawyer to hesitate to refer client work to others within the firm who can 
perform tasks more ably than she. Further, there is no penalty at the 
firm level from having work referred by firm members to each other; 
aggregate billings will not be reduced by such activity. In contrast, 
lawyers in affiliated firms will be much more reluctant to refer work to 
one another in response to client needs. In the absence of pooled profits, 
a referring law firm will not share in the rents accruing from work 
performed on a referred client file. Consequently, lawyers will struggle 
to hold onto their files, that is, 'hogging,' even if the work can be 
performed more expeditiously and competently by members of the affi- 
liated firm. These disincentives will be buttressed by concerns relating 
to 'client grabbing' and the fear that the lawyer receiving the referral will 
attempt to sell the client services originally being offered by the referring 
firm. This concern explains the higher frequency of these types of 
affiliation relationships among firms with non-competitive specialties. 
A final difficulty with the affiliation mechanism is that it is highly 
unstable and prone to relatively early termination by parties. In large 
part, the susceptibility of the affiliation to early termination reflects the 
lack of tangible investment made by the parties in assets that are specific 
76 	In local markets, these relationships most often involve firms with very sharply 
divergent areas of practice, so that firms can refer work to each other without 
having to worry that the firm receiving the referral will attempt to service client 
needs in areas where the referring firm has expertise. 
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to the relationship. Without asset-specific investment, the parties will have 
little incentive to overcome the perverse incentive problems identified 
above and to persevere in trying to extract whatever economies can be 
realized from the relationship. These asset-specific investments can in- 
clude the creation of computer networks that can interface among the 
partner firms, common data banks, shared client promotion lists, and so 
forth. 
5. Summary 
This discussion suggests that internal growth is the preferable vehicle 
for local firm growth in a setting where client needs can be forecast with 
confidence and where firms have the necessary expertise to train new 
lawyers effectively: it is the device best suited to the preservation of firm 
reputational capital. Cherry picking or lateral hiring is probably most 
effective in responding to client demands in areas where the firm lacks 
the expertise to develop the speciality in-house, or where, owing to par- 
ticularly intense client preferences, expertise must be acquired quickly. 
Merging is probably most effective in situations where there is asymmetri- 
cal strength between merging parties, obviating the need for time- 
consuming and acrimonious debate on the nature of the firm. Finally, the 
affiliation device is likely to be least effective in obtaining the benefits of 
growth, at least at a local level. The strains inherent in the relationship 
indicate that few of the putative benefits from these relationships are ever 
realized. The one exception, perhaps, is those cases where commitments 
that the affiliating partners will not 'grab' each other's clients can be 
credibly made. These commitments will take the form of agreements to 
refrain from developing practice expertise in areas that compete directly 
with the affiliating firm. 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH IN A NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL SEn ING  FOR INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
What impact, if any, does geographic dispersion have on the hierarchy 
identified above? One would expect that the difficulties associated would 
be intensified. Lack of geographical proximity is bound to increase the 
amount of uncertainty that partners have in relation to the other party's 
strengths and weaknesses. This distance greatly diminishes the oppor- 
tunities for pre-merger investigation of a merging firm's professional 
excellence, the quality of its client base, and the content of its culture. 
These problems are especially acute when the merger instrument is 
considered in the context of international mergers. Here, the potential 
for serious, perhaps irreparable mistakes is greatest. Because the parties 
are not likely to have had the intensive one-on-one contact across all 
ranks of the firm, the information problems respecting the quality of 
individual prospective partners will be aggravated in comparison to 
domestic mergers. 
The role of the affiliation device in a multi-jurisdictional setting is 
more equivocal, and is a direct function of the degree of overlap that 
exists in scope of serviceable markets possessed by affiliate^.^' The higher 
the degree of overlap in the markets of the two firms, the stronger will 
be the incentives facing the firms to defect from the arrangements by 
engaging in the hogging and grabbing activities enumerated earlier. In 
other words, as serviceable client markets overlap, firms will reason that 
it makes greater economic sense to satisfy a client's needs, rather than 
referring work to the affiliate.78 
The scope of a single branch firm's legal market is based on the 
intersection of two broad considerations: client location and breadth of 
expertise. The way in which these combine to determine market size is 
illustrated in the standard matrix shown in diagram 1. The axes of the 
matrix identify the possible array of combinations of governing law and 
client location that can characterize a given transaction. Obviously, single 
branch law firms can most effectively service client needs when the client 
is located in the home jurisdiction of the firm and where that juris- 
diction's laws govern the transaction (quadrant 1). However, once an 
extraterritorial element is introduced, in terms of either foreign 
governing law or foreign clients, the ability of the single branch firm to 
service that transaction becomes somewhat more tenuous. Specifically, 
one would expect that the single branch firm's capacity to compete is 
least obvious in the case of transactions involving foreign clients and 
foreign governing law (quadrant 3), with transactions involving mixtures 
77 	Law firms in Australia and the United Kingdom have used the affiliation device as 
a means of growth. See P. Curtain 'When is a Merger Not a Merger?' (July 1987) 
International Financial LR 8, and J. Carr 'Executive Associations: Halfway House or 
Cure-All?' (May 1990) Int. Financial LR 11. 
78 	Owing to the endemic incentive problems discussed earlier, firms will be reluctant 
to part readily with client files, even when parts of the file have aspects closely 
associated with the jurisdiction in which an affiliate firm is located. Unless assured 
that a client referral will be met with a referral of equal or greater value, firms with 
non-pooled receipts will reduce to a bare minimum the amount of work that is 
referred to lawyers in an affiliate firm. Predictably, the more effectively lawyers 
located in the referring firm can service client needs in a jurisdiction containing an 
afliliated firm, the less inclined will lawyers be to refer work to the affiliate. In this 
vein, see R. Weil 'The Myth of the National Law Firm' Uanuary/Febmary 1981) 7 
Ggal Econ. 44: 'What is there to hold together 16 branches of an immigration law 
firm? Why should an immigration law practitioner want to send part of his profits 
to a home office in Miami? Once regional lawyers are trained in the nuances of the 
specialty they are quite capable of proceeding on their own.' 
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DIAGRAM 1 
Matrix showing possible combinations of client location and governing law 
Home client 
Home law 1 2 
Home client 
Foreign law 
Foreign client 
Home law 
4 3 
Foreign client 
Foreign law 
of home and foreign elements (quadrants 2 and 4) somewhere between 
these two poles. 
There are three basic factors underlying the rankings developed in the 
matrix found in diagram 1. The first factor is the presence and magni- 
tude of artificial (governmental or quasi-governmental) entry barriers that 
are aimed at limiting the ability of the firm to work on transactions 
involving either host state law or host state client^.'^ Generally, entry 
barriers focus on the former, although some jurisdictions also attempt to 
control the latter. Despite arguments that the rationale for these 
restrictions is based on consumer protection goals, the rigidity and 
breadth of the restrictions suggest that industry protection goals are just 
as important, if not more so. The second factor affecting the breadth of 
serviceable markets is the applicability of expertise developed in the 
home jurisdiction to transactions governed by the host jurisdiction's legal 
system. The more convergent the content of the home and host states' 
legal systems, the greater the likelihood that the single branch firm will 
be able to opine on legal matters involving the host state's laws. This 
factor can also be viewed as a measure of the firm's asset-specific 
investment. The third factor influencing market definition is the quantum 
of technical production costs?' If, for instance, a transaction involves a 
foreign client, then the single branch law firm will incur charges in 
communicating with that client in the form of long-distance telephone, 
79 See N. Wischnewski 'Free Trade, Eh?' (February 1988) 11 Can. Lawper 11. 
80 The explosion in new forms of communications technology renders the geographic 
separation between the lawyer and her home base much less significant than in the 
past. If computerized, a firm's legal memoranda, legal precedent, and client files 
can be instantaneously accessed by lawyers temporarily resident in another 
jurisdiction through relatively inexpensive interface technology. Moreover, through 
use of commercial data bases, lawyers can use computer technology to access legal 
cases and statutory sources. In combination, these new forms of technology greatly 
reduce the importance of the client's geographic proximity to the location of a 
single branch firm. 
computer, and fax charges, and hotel and transportation bills that would 
not have arisen were the transaction executed by firms in the host 
jurisdiction." However, these additional technical costs may well be 
eclipsed by the savings generated by the home firm's expertise, especially 
when the transaction implicates laws extant in the home jurisdiction. 
When the scope for overlapping markets is considered, the prospect 
for durable law firm affiliation arrangements seems least likely in the case 
of affiliations among firms in a unitary state, somewhat more likely in the 
case of affiliations among firms located in different subnational jurisdic- 
tions in a federal state, and most likely in the case of affiliations among 
firms in an international setting. Assuming a relatively developed and 
cost-efficient telecommunications infrastructure, affiliating firms in the 
unitary state are unlikely to be impeded by serious artificial or natural 
barriers to practice and therefore will face strong incentives to defect. 
In the case of affiliations among firms in federal countries, however, the 
presence of artificial and natural entry barriers arising from explicit 
action of subnational governments (discriminatory licensing require- 
ments, for example) or from divergences in the content of subnational 
legal regimes will constrain the growth of markets of single branch firms, 
making affiliation arrangements more attractive and durable. Neverthe- 
less, if a given transaction is governed principally by national laws or by 
local laws in which the single branch firm has amassed some familiarity?' 
then these impediments become less important, reintroducing destabiliz- 
ing incentives for defection. Finally, in an international setting, save for 
a handful of so-called stateless transactions such as Euromarket financ-
ings, the combination of artificial and natural barriers to extraterritorial 
provision of legal services would appear to be most formidable, with the 
consequence that the scope for market overlap is smallest. This is because 
of the combined effect of extremely protectionist entry barriers, highly 
81 Distinctive technical production costs may also be incurred if the transaction involves 
home jurisdiction clients but host jurisdiction laws. In this case, the costs of 
production will be raised by the marginal amount of funds expended on 
investigating appropriate legal precedents. 
82 In the case, for instance, of securities law transactions effected across multiple sub- 
national jurisdictions, the fact that lawyers in large corporate law firms will, of 
necessity, have developed a familiarity with the laws extant in all of the subnational 
jurisdictions in order to service the normal course needs of clients in their own 
jurisdiction mitigates the capacity of these differences to serve as barriers to the 
effective provision of legal services. In Canada, for example, it is utterly inconceiv- 
able that a securities law practice of any description could be established and 
maintained without the lawyers' thorough knowledge of the nuances of each 
province's securities regimes. The same is true of many other legal specialties. 
divergent legal regimes?' and more expensive technical production costs. 
As mentioned above, the creation of rigidly segmented markets makes 
affiliation arrangements more likely to survive. 
The final form of achieving law firm growth in a multijurisdictional 
setting is greenfielding, a variant on lateral recruitment. Greenfielding 
is the opening of a branch office in another jurisdiction that is usually 
staffed by lawyers recruited from firms operating in the host jurisdiction. 
The benefits of greenfielding are obvious. By recruiting lawyers from 
firms located in the host jurisdiction, a firm can acquire jurisdiction- 
specific legal expertise without having to confi-ont the tied-sales problems 
present in the merger context. But the downside to legal industry 
greenfielding is substantial, and reflects the corrosive force that patch- 
work assembly of legal teams can have on the capacity of the firm to 
transplant its core values and ethic to the branch ofice. If, as is likely, 
the lawyers recruited for a greenfield office have deeply ingrained 
approaches to legal practice that are incompatible with the culture of the 
'acquiring' firm, then the firm's capacity to control agency costs and its 
ability to preserve reputational capital will be endangered. These prob- 
lems may be partially mitigated by transferring a core of lawyers from the 
firm's 'head office' to the branch to initiate laterally hired recruits into 
the firm's culture. 
v 	T h  Canadian experience 
A. 	 INTRODUCTION 
In this section, I analyze the instruments by which Canadian law firms 
have grown in local, national, and international settings. In the main, the 
analysis in this section is informed by the results of an extensive set of 
interviews that I and two research assistants conducted from July 1989 
to September 1990 with senior partners in 40 leading law firms located 
in Calgary, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Vancouver. Examination of 
the instruments deployed by law firms in different contexts provides a 
useful case study for the theoretical claims made in the previous two 
sections. To the extent that praxis and theory diverge, I offer different 
possible hypotheses for this gulf. 
83 	Although supranational agreements have exerted a harmonizing effect on the laws 
of different nations, the content even of the developed countries' legal regimes is 
far from uniform. In large part, this divergence in the content of laws reflects 
widely varying levels of commitment to the harmonization enterprise. 
TABLE 6 
Law firm associations 
Date 	 Firms involved Office locations Size 
Local and regional arsociatiodmcrgers 
1981 Martineau Walker 
Gagnon & Lafeur 
1982 Martineau Walker 
Lazovitch Cannon & Lemmelin 
1983 Cowling & Henderson 
Cameron Bruin & Scott 
1984 Cassels Brock 
Blackwell Law Spratt 
1985 Clarkson Tttrault 
Drouin et Associes 
1985 Osler Hoskin & Harcourt 
Herridge Tolmie 
1986 Cowling & Henderson 
Simmer Harper &Jenkins 
1986 Parlee Irving 
McLaws & Co. 
1986 Lang Michener 
Lash Johnston 
Feb. 1989 Cowling & Henderson 
Strathy Archibald & Seagram 
July 1989 Stewart MacKeen & Covert 
McKelvey MacAulay & Machum 
Oct. 1989 Fasken & Calvin 
Campbell Godfrey & Lewtas 
1989 Russell & DuMoulin 
Lyall McKercher Hanna 
Feb. 1990 Houlden Murdoch & Finlay 
Day Wilson Campbell 
May 1 990 	 Stewart MacKeen & Covert 
McKelvey MacAulay Machum 
Stirling Ryan 
Scales Jenkins & McQuaid 
National associotions/mergers 
1976 Martineau Walker 
Stapels Sewell 
1981 McCarthy & McCarthy 
Black & Co. 
1985 McCarthy & McCarthy 
Shrum Liddle Hebenton 
1986 Fasken & Calvin 
Martineau Walker 
1987 Goodman & Goodman 
Phillips & Vineberg 
Sept. 1988 Goodman & Carr 
Lapointe Rosenstein 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Montreal 
Quebec City 
Ottawa 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Montreal 
Quebec City 
Toronto 
Ottawa 
Ottawa 
Cambridge & Kitchener 
Edmonton 
Calgary
Toronto 
Toronto 
Ottawa 
Toronto 
Halifax 
Saint John (NB) 
Toron to 
Toronto 
Vancouver 
Vancouver 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Halifax 
Saint John (NB) 
St. John's 
Charlottetown 
Montreal 
Toronto 
Toronto 
Calgary 
Toronto 
Vancouver 
Toronto 
Montreal 
Toronto 
Montreal 
Toronto 
Montreal 
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TABLE 6 continued 
Date Firms involved Ofice locations Size 
Apr. 1989 Borden & Elliot Toronto 162 
Howard Mackie Calgary 72 
Apr. 1989 Blake Cassels & Graydon Toronto 250 
Jordan Gaul & Storrow Vancouver 9 
May 1989 Blake Cassels & Graydon 
Duncan Collins 
Toronto 
cakarY 
250 
25 
May 1989 Osler Hoskin & Harcourt Toronto 240 
Ogilvy Renault Montreal 140 
June 1989 Lang Michener Lash Johnston Toronto 117 
Lawrence & Shaw Vancouver 47 
July 1989 Goodman & Goodman Toronto 52 
Phillips & Vineberg Montreal 48 
Freeman & Co. Vancouver 48 
Nov. 1989 Bennett Jones Calgary 116 
Verchere Noel & Eddy Montreal and Toronto 22 
Nov. 1989 McMillan Binch Toronto 102 
Bull Housser & Tupper Vancouver 109 
Byers Casgrain Montreal 46 
Dec. 1989 Tory Tory Toronto 129 
Desjardins Ducharme Montreal 76 
Lawson Lundell Vancouver 62 
Jan. 1990 McCarthy & McCarthy Toronto + 340 
Clarkson Tetrault Montreal 100 
Feb. 1990 Goodman & Carr Toronto 105 
Lapointe Rosenstein Montreal 45 
Ferguson Gifford Vancouver 44 
Apr. 1990 Fraser & Beatty Toronto 185 
Mawhinney & Kellough Vancouver 25 
1990 Fasken Martineau Walker Toronto and Montreal n/a 
Davis & Co. Vancouver 85 
June 1990 Aird & Berlis Toronto 68 
Boughton Peterson Vancouver 41 
Oct. 1990 Borden & Elliot Toronto 203 
Russell DuMoulin Vancouver 165 
Howard Mackie Calgary 75 
Mackenzie Gervais Montreal 55 
Oct. 1990 Osler Hoskin & Harcourt Toronto 164 
Ladner Downs Vancouver 288 
Source: This data was drawn from announcements in the Globe andMail and interviews with 
representatives from the law firms involved. 
B. THE LOCAL CONTEXT 
In  table 6, the frequency of merger and affiliation activity among 
approximately 60 firms in both local and national contexts is examined. 
Viewed as a whole, these data show that the level of merger and 
affiliation activity among Canadian law firms has increased over the last 
five years. Yet deipite global increases in merger and affiliation activity, 
local mergers and affiliations did not appear to be terribly significant 
forces in explaining local growth." While in 1984 there was only one 
local merger involving 61 lawyers, by 1989 the total number of local 
mergers had only increased to 3 involving more than 589 lawyers. The 
handful of mergers that did occur during this time were the subject of 
considerable debate in the legal community. Although lawyers in the 
firms involved in these local mergers cited the realization of synergies as 
the motivation for the mergers -most frequently in the form of manying 
complementary corporate/commercial and litigation expertise - their 
competitors were dubious of the strength of these synergies. And, among 
both participating firms and competitors, concern was frequently 
expressed over the capacity of the merging parties to wrest synergistic 
benefits from the mergers given innate differences in the culture of the 
merging firms.85 An interesting and not infrequently identified factor 
motivating local mergers among firms outside Toronto was preparation 
for mergers or affiliations with Toronto firms. That is, recognizing the 
inevitability of mergers with Toronto firms, some firms in Vancouver 
and Montreal admitted that they had proposed mergers with other local 
firms in an effort to 'bulk up' or strengthen their numbers so that in the 
event that the firm remained independent, it would be able to compete 
more effectively with Toronto firms or, alternatively, in the event that the 
firm decided to merge or affiliate with a Toronto firm, it would have 
greater bargaining power to safeguard its interests when negotiating 
professional autonomy, style of practice, or compensation issues.86 It is 
nevertheless significant that mergers proposed along these lines rarely 
moved beyond the embryonic stage to actual execution. 
C. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
1. Overoim 
Table 6 also shows the pattern of merger and affiliation activity carried 
out nationally over the last five years. Between 1985 and 1987, there 
were 3 mergers affecting 468 lawyers, but by 1989, there were 9 mergers 
involving 1872 lawyers. Despite the fact that in absolute terms the 
number of national mergers and affiliations is relatively small, their 
84 Instead of mergers or affiliations, most local growth has been achieved by way of 
internal growth and cherry picking. 
85 This point is elaborated on at length in Daniels, supra note 16. 
86 Interestingly, in recent months, some Toronto practitioners have begun to 
contemplate, perhaps only superficially, the prospect of a merger with another 
Toronto firm in order to 'bulk up' in preparation for the mass entry of foreign 
(that is, American) firms into the Canadian market. 
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significance should not be underestimated given the highly concentrated 
nature of the Canadian legal community. Indeed, by 1991 the pool of 
potential affiliation partners among the major Canadian law firms had 
dwindled dramatically, leaving only about 20 unhitched major law firms 
in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. 
The triumph of national mergers and affiliations poses some very 
troubling questions for the analysis developed in the last two sections. 
First, in terms of the rationale underlying national growth, the demand 
and supply trends canvassed in section 111 do not appear supportive of 
growth along this axis. On the demand side, there was little evidence 
indicating a massive increase in the amount of interprovincial commer- 
cial activity over the last decade. In fact, to the extent that practitioners 
raised this factor at all, they were firmly of the view that interprovincial 
barriers to the mobility of factors and goods had grown in importance, 
thereby diminishing the capacity of Canadian business to undertake 
national activity. On the supply side, burgeoning rates of innovation in 
the technology of the law firm (fax machines and computerized data 
bases, for example) appear to make it less rather than more expensive 
for practitioners to service clients on a pan-national basis out of a single 
office. In these terms, it would seem that so long as lawyers were willing 
to live out of a suitcase for some time, the single branch office would 
suffice as a means of organizing national legal activity. 
Even more perplexing than the existence of growth along national 
lines was the instrument chosen to accommodate this growth. Despite 
vagaries in nomenclature, most of the associations consummated among 
Canadian firms turned out to be based on the affiliation model. That is, 
even firms claiming to have 'merged' or to have created 'national 
partnerships' used separate profit centres and appeared to have engaged 
in little, if any, smoothing of incomes between cities. In view of the 
relatively trivial entry barriers operating against Canadian law firms in a 
national setting, the theory propounded in section IVsuggests a different 
array of growth instruments, with greenfielding and merging being the 
most desirable options. 
In the following parts, the nature of national affiliation arrangements 
will be explored in greater detail, and I will then try to address the 
related issues of why firms have decided to grow nationally and why they 
have consistently favoured the affiliation device. 
2. The affdiution arrangement explored 
Why have law firms favoured the relatively loose set of ties, particular- 
ly the non-integrated profit pooling, implied by the affiliation model? 
The reasons given for this reluctance varied from firm to firm. While 
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partners in some firms claimed that profit sharing was not necessary to 
the survival of an affiliation arrangement, partners in other firms 
conceded that financial pooling would be 'logical' and 'desirable,' but that 
practical difficulties, such as intense disagreement over the form of 
financial distribution arrangements, intervened to thwart implementation 
of more ambitious integration schemes. Particularly difficult to resolve 
was the issue of whether professional incomes for all lawyers in the 
affiliated firms should, irrespective of the actual location of practice, be 
calculated solely on merit and seniority principle^.^' To the extent that 
evidence of profit sharing was observed in the affiliation arrangements, 
it was typically concentrated on the firms' international partnership 
activities, which were organized as a separate profit pool. Yet, despite the 
lack of integrated profit pooling, most affiliation arrangements did 
involve some level of rationalization. Many of the firms were jointly 
developing computerized accounting and record-keeping systems, while 
some even professed to be developing common marketing strategies in 
both domestic and international markets. 
At the heart of national affiliation arrangements was commitment to 
refer work to lawyers in affiliated firms on the basis of established 
criteria. However, these commitments were by no means uniform across 
different firm affiliations, varying greatly in terms of the depth and scope 
of the referral obligation. Most of the lawyers interviewed emphasized 
that the agreements were quite amorphous, and that their force relied 
much more on a spirit of good will and decency than on technical legal 
obligations. As evidence of the amorphousness of their obligations under 
affiliation agreements, most lawyers in affiliated relationships claimed that 
no clear rules were specified as to when a firm was required or expected 
to turn over a file to an affiliate. The potential for such broadly drafted 
agreements to spawn serious confusion and disappointment is under- 
scored by the starkly different interpretations that different firms in the 
87 	Since, at the time that the interviews were conducted, there was a substantial dif- 
ferential between the income earned by Toronto lawyers in comparison to lawyers 
in other parts of the country, Toronto lawyen were understandably reluctant to 
argue for uniform income policies, and lawyen outside Toronto in affiliated firms 
held out little hope that such policies would be adopted. (The 1990 annual lawyers' 
survey in Canodiun L a y  found that Toronto partners called to the bar between 
1985 and 1989 earned an average of $152,000, while lawyers in Calgary, Montreal, 
and Vancouver earned $84,750, $126,250, and $111,250, respectively. See (June 
199 1) Canodiun Lawyer 18. 
88 	Although many firms understood their affiliation responsibilities as requiring them 
to ensure that all work being referred to firms located in an affiliate firm's 
jurisdiction be funnelled to the affiliate, the issue of when work would be referred 
in the first place was largely discretionary, and left considerable scope for hogging. 
same affiliation arrangement gave to their obligations under the agree- 
ment. In more than one instance, firms in one jurisdiction envisaged 
their referral commitments pursuant to the affiliation agreement to be far 
less onerous than their partners did who were located in other jurisdic- 
tions. 
Similar confusion was encountered among and within various affilia- 
tion groups respecting the treatment and resolution of client conflicts. 
While some lawyers felt that the affiliation structure created serious con- 
flicts of interest among the participating firms that were in need of 
urgent resolution, other lawyers felt that the affiliation structure offered 
participating firms sufficient independence to obviate any concern over 
conflict^.'^ This divergence in approaches to conflicts masked the sub- 
stantial similarity in the underlying structure of the various arrange- 
ments. 
Another common feature of these arrangements was the constancy of 
the originating cities of the firms participating in affiliations - national 
affiliations rarely departed from a tripartite model, wherein participation 
was confined to law firms based in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. 
Although some affiliations included participation of firms located in 
Calgary or Ottawa, by and large these were except i~nal .~~ wereWe 
unable to find evidence of any affiliations among firms in the Maritimes 
with firms in Central and Western Canada.g' When Calgary or Ottawa 
lawyers were asked why they were not privy to these arrangements, most 
indicated that the economies of their provinces were too regional in 
character to justify inclusion. According to these lawyers, regional 
concentration of economic activity in Alberta and Northeastern Ontario 
diminished the incentive for firms located in Toronto, Montreal, or 
Vancouver to affiliate with firms in Calgary or Ottawa because clients in 
both of these areas had little commercial interaction with each other. 
Consequently, affiliations among these firms would yield only marginal 
economic benefits to consumers of legal services.= In this respect, the 
89 In Australia, reliance on the affiliation model is partially explained by its putative 
ability to avoid having to address issues of client conflict. See Curtain 'When Is a 
Merger Not a Merger?' supra note 77, 10. 
90 See table 6. 
91 There is, however, evidence of affiliation activity concentrated on the East Coast of 
Canada. The law firm Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales, created by a number of 
mergers, has offices in Charlottetown, Halifax, Sydney, Saint John, Moncton, and St. 
John's. 
92 This was especially true for Calgary, where most of the legal work is tied to the 
foreign-controlled oil and gas industry, leaving the industry less dependent on 
lack of significant national affiliation or merger activity outside the 
Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver axis confirms the inability of supply- 
side factors to vindicate law firm growth objectives in a way that is 
oblivious to demand-side considerations. Were supply-side factors alone 
able to determine the growth pattern of law firms, then one would expect 
to find much greater levels of affiliation activity between central Canadian 
law firms and Calgary firms because of the benefits to internal income 
diversification goals when participating firms are located in relatively 
distinct regional economies. 
Another arresting feature of national affiliation arrangements is that 
they often serve as the foundation upon which international activities of 
the participating firms are based.93 That is, pursuant to the affiliation 
agreement, firms have agreed to support the creation and/or main- 
tenance of international offices representing the affiliating firms. Most of 
the lawyers interviewed attributed the inclusion of commitments 
respecting foreign offices in the affiliation package to the daunting 
character of the investment required to launch these offices. Given both 
the highly speculative nature of these offices and the onerous start-up 
and maintenance costs of a foreign office (often in excess of $1 million 
annually), most firms were anxious to diversify some of the risk of these 
ventures, and the affiliation arrangement provided a useful device. 
In view of the ambiguity inherent in many of the terms of the affilia- 
tion agreements, virtually all affiliated firms have understood the im- 
portance of establishing a governance mechanism to sort out and recon- 
cile many of the conflicts that are destined to arise between the firms. 
Accordingly, steering or coordinating committees have been created that 
consist of one or two senior partners from each affiliating firm and that 
are charged with the dual tasks of easing the transition from independent 
to affiliated firms and of resolving conflicts among the affiliates. At the 
time that the interviews were conducted, most of the steering committees 
were preoccupied with transitions issues, such as inculcating commit- 
ments to the affiliation venture among lawyers in the constituent firms, 
and had given only cursory attention to conflicts problems. So seriously 
was the goal of integration being pursued that national retreats for the 
domestically generated pools of capital or on cooperative enterprise with firms in 
other Canadian industries. 
93 One exception, however, is the international partnership of Osler Hoskin & 
Harcourt (Toronto), Ogilvy Renault (Montreal), and Ladner Downs (Vancouver). 
These firms have not entered into any national affiliation arrangement, and 
presumably this reflects concern over losses in referrals from unaffiliated firms 
across Canada and concern over client conflicts of interest. 
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entire partnership were being orchestrated, as well as the formation of 
national practice groups in certain legal specialties. 
A final characteristic of national affiliations was the relatively abbre- 
viated time-frame in which they were consummated. Although the link- 
age between McCarthy & McCarthy and Black & Company was con- 
cluded as early as 198 1, relatively few national linkages were created until 
1989. In large part, the reason for this delay resides in the role played 
by interprovincial barriers in suppressing the creation of national law 
firms.% While the putative benefits of national law firms may have existed 
for some time, firms were unable to exploit these benefits because of re- 
strictions imposed by provincial law societies on the creation of such link- 
ages. However, once the Supreme Court of Canada lent its imprimatur 
to national law firms in the Black decision, there was no serious legal 
impediment and firms were free to consummate these arrangements?' 
3.  Alternative explanations for national affiliation activity 
Some light can be cast on the decision of Canadian law firms to under- 
take national growth and to do so via the affiliation device by considering 
several different factors: (a) information asymmetries between producers 
and consumers of legal services; (b) external limitations on the form of 
organization; (c) efficient pre-merger search activity; and (d) destabilized 
referral arrangements ('rat race' explanation). 
a. Informution asymmetries between producers and consuws of legal services. 
One possible factor explaining the rise of national affiliations is exploita- 
tion-of-consumer-ignorance by legal suppliers. The exploitation of 
consumer ignorance story runs as follows. The market for legal services 
is plagued by endemic information asymmetries that favour lawyers. 
Although national affiliation activity yields little if any tangible benefit to 
consumers, it does confer benefits on some lawyers. These benefits come 
in the form of psychological satisfaction from firm expansionw and in the 
94 These barriers take the form of various provincial law society restrictions on the 
capacity of lawyers called in one province to practice in another. See B. Filipow Jr 
'Getting National Mobility in Motion' (September 1982) 6 7  C a d i a n  Lawyer 45. 
Similar restrictions have, in the past, impeded the movement of law firms within 
the United States: see, for instance, P.C.Beck 'Why Large Firms Have Not 
Incorporated' (1971-72) 12 Law Off.Econ. Mgmt. 516. 
95 Law Sociely of Alberta v. B h k  et nl. (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 317 
96 There is a long line of analysis in the management literature dealing with the 
propensity of corporate managers to favour growth, that is, empire-building goals 
over profit objectives. See, for instance, W. Baumol Business Behavior, Value and 
Growth (New York: MacMillan 1959); R. Marris Tlu Economic Tluory of 'Managed'  
form of various perquisites of office.97 That is, by mouthing the mantra 
of 'synergies,' 'economies of scale,' or 'rationalized production,' firms 
were able to fool unsuspecting consumers into bearing the various 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs entailed by affiliation activity.98 
At a theoretical level, there are strong reasons for rejecting the sinister 
story of deliberate exploitation of consumer ignorance as a valid 
explanation for national affiliation activity. To start, fairly sophisticated 
corporate clients would be unlikely to suffer the afflictions of more costly 
law firm structures without some degree of compensating benefit. The 
claim that clever marketing will lend a veneer of legitimacy to what is an 
otherwise economically valueless range of activities seems implausible, 
especially when the monitoring role of in-house counsel is considered.'' 
To the extent that these relationships are bereft of economic value, then, 
providing there are no insuperable barriers to client m~vement,'~" 
competitor law firms not burdened with these relationships should be 
able to lure clients away. Further, given the consensus-based management 
structures employed in most firms, it is unlikely that a core group of 
partners would be able to appropriate a disproportionate share of non- 
pecuniary benefits from worthless affiliation activity without raising the 
ire of their colleagues. For all these reasons, theory would suggest a 
heavy discount of the sinister explanation.'O1 
Capikdism (New York: Free Press of Glencoe 1964); and 0.Williamson 'Managerial 
Discretion and Business Behavior' (1963) 53 Am. Ecm. Rev. 1032 at 1033-4. 
97 	Lawyers in some firms, pointing to the variety of 'perks' that accompany such 

affiliations, for example, frequent trips, national partner retreats, and relief from 

client servicing duties, alleged that the only real beneficiaries of the trend were 

senior partners in the affiliating firms. Of course, under this hypothesis, those 

exploited in the national affiliation wave include not only the clients of these 

partnerships, but their partners and associates as well. 

98 However, at least a few firms acknowledged that filiation arrangements yielded 

some 'slight psychological benefits.' 

99 One corporate counsel interviewed during the course of our study said that upon 

being informed by his corporation's Toronto law firm that they had concluded an 

affiliation with firms in Vancouver and Montreal, he responded by wishing them the 

best of luck in their venture and instructed them to continue to refer all work 

requiring counsel in either Quebec or British Columbia to the outside law firms that 

the corporation regularly used in these jurisdictions, which were not, of course, the 

firms that the Toronto firm had affiliated with. Nevertheless, the fact that at least some 

national filiations occurred between firms that had traditionally serviced the needs 

of the same large national client, for example, one of the five major Canadian banks, 

suggests that outside counsel will be supportive of the creation of some affiliation 

groups. 

100 That is, client-specific investments made by the firm. 
101 A more benign variant of the asymmetrical information hypothesis turns on the 
vulnerability of lawyers to perverse client and supplier demands. That is, a number 
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One troubling feature, however, of the outright rejection of the 
sinister explanation was the frequency and vehemence with which lawyers 
both in affiliating and non-affiliating firms argued that affiliations were 
bereft of economic value. Substantiating these claims was the admission 
made by lawyers in most affiliating firms that the amount of referral work 
from firms in other cities remained the same after the affiliation as 
before, although the balance between work derived from affiliates and 
non-affiliates had clearly shifted in favour of the former. If true, this 
evidence provides some support for the theoretical claim developed 
previously that argues against the affiliation form of organization in a 
national setting, implying that the force of consumer resistance will 
unravel these arrangements. Nevertheless, as my survey was undertaken 
at a relatively early point in these affiliation arrangements, it may be 
premature to reject the value of national affiliations. 
b. External limitations on the form of organizution. A more plausible 
explanation for the form and timing of national affiliations focuses on the 
of law firms, even several of those actually consummating a national affiliation, readily 
admitted that there was little benefit from affiliation activity, that affiliations were all 
'smoke and mirrors,' but that some clients were insistent about being serviced by firms 
having national affiliations. These concerns were expressed most frequently by foreign 
clients in relation to work to be performed by Vancouver and, to a lesser degree, 
Montreal firms. The reasons for these preferences are somewhat mysterious. Given an 
existing set of informal but effective referral arrangements, there appears to be little 
basis for foreign clients to worry about the capacity of a non-affiliated firm to render 
competent legal services in respect of a transnational transaction. (Perhaps these fears 
can be related to exaggerated external concern over the fragmentation of the Canadian 
economic union.) Perverse preferences in favour of affiliation activity were also 
reported to emanate from graduating law students. In particular, unaffiliated law firms 
found that their recruitment efforts, particularly during the years of heightened law 
firm affiliation activity in 1988 and 1989, were impeded by the lack of national 
linkages. If accurate, the premium placed on national linkages by law students is 
somewhat puzzling. Given that few, if any, firms consummating these linkages held out 
the prospect of increased interjurisdictional mobility as being an important motivating 
rationale, it is unlikely that students are attracted to these firms for the prospect of 
travel benefits. And, given the ambiguity that surrounds these arrangements in the first 
instance, it is unlikely that the presence or absence of national linkages is an effective 
signal of firm quality. Despite the fact that the preferences of both clients and 
prospective lawyers may be perverse, the existence of such pressures does exert an 
undeniable impact on firms. The question is, of course, how firms react to these 
pressures. One strategy is to try to make both consumers and students aware of the 
flimsy foundation upon which their expectations respecting national linkages are based. 
But, in the event that non-affiliated firms are unable to credibly convey this point, an 
alternative strategy is simply to capitulate to the dictates of the market. In these terms, 
the effectuation of a loosely conceived national linkage may be the most cost effective 
way to satisfy market fads and fashions. 
role that professional self-regulatory agencies, such as the provincial law 
societies, have played in limiting the ability of lawyers to finance new 
initiatives. The two most important restrictions are prohibitions on the 
ownership of shares by non-lawyers and the lack oflimited liability.lo4 The 
deprivation of these share attributes effectively bars Canadian law firms 
from raising capital by the sale of equity shares to the general public. As 
a consequence, law firms are required to resort to bank borrowing to 
raise new capital. Yet, given the lack of tangible physical assets owned by 
the firm and the impediments to enforcing specific performance of claims 
on human capital, the security that can be offered to banks is quite 
limited. Historically, these restrictions were not onerous, but it can be 
argued that they have recently become much more debilitating.I0' In 
large measure, this is attributable to the demands placed on Canadian 
law firms to open offices in foreign jurisdictions. These offices involve 
considerable expense and effort, and offer only uncertain reward. They 
are, by far, among the most risky marketing ventures ever undertaken 
by Canadian law firms. One way of coping with restrictions on the sale 
of equity to specialized risk bearers is to spread the costs of these 
ventures over more lawyers. This is, in fact, one of the characteristics of 
the national affiliation: the joint sharing of the development costs of 
foreign offices. Perhaps the joint sharing of the development costs of 
computer software, and so forth, can also be explained in these terms. 
If accurate, the clear implication of this factor is that it may be time to 
rethink the efficacy of restricting the ability of large law firms to access 
equity markets through the sale of limited liability shares.lM By allowing 
law firms to sell equity stakes, the risk of foreign market failure may be 
shifted to parties having a comparative advantage in risk bearing. Some 
may object to this prospect on the grounds that the extension of limited 
liability to non-professional owners would attenuate some of the desirable 
102 The various restrictions on the law firm form that are imposed by various 
regulations are described and evaluated by Prichard, supra note 7. 
103 Ibid. Prichard presciently observed that, although the capital needs of law firms in 
the late 1970s were sufficiently modest that they could be satisfied by the current 
partnership structure of the firm, this would not always necessarily be so, especially 
in view of the possibility that delivery of legal services in Canada will be effected 
by way of multi-province, multi-office firms. 
104 An argument - on different grounds - against reliance on the worker-owned firm 
model as the exclusive method of delivering legal services has been recently made 
by H. Hansmann 'When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, 
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy' (1990) 99 Yak LJ 1749. Hansmann 
claims that the internal costs of governance in non-homogeneous workforces are 
sufficiently large as to render worker-owned firms less efficient modes of 
organization. 
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monitoring properties instilled by the restriction. However, to the extent 
that professional responsibility concerns are implicated, they should be 
addressed through a variety of more finely honed instruments that 
specify standards of conduct in a clearer form.'05 Indeed, one suspects 
that the benefits from subjecting law firms to the discipline of having to 
detail and justify their expansion plans to outside investors, when 
combined with the diminished risk of financial distress faced by lawyers 
if they can shift some of the risk to outside investors, will clearly inure to 
the benefit of consumers. 
c .  Efficient search activity. One way of explaining the preponderance of 
affiliation-type arrangements is to readily acknowledge their imperfec- 
tions, but to argue that they are merely transitory arrangements that are 
precursors to more integrated mergers. According to this argument, the 
risks of large-scale mistakes when mergers in different cities are effected 
has caused law firms to enter into arrangements that furnish an 
opportunity for structured interaction over a prescribed time period, with 
the option to escalate the arrangement to a full merger should both 
parties be confident that the issues involved in a merger can be satisfac- 
torily resolved. As a number of firms pointed out, these arrangements are 
akin to 'living together before marriage.'Io6 In this vein, these agreements 
stand as an institutionalized form of search activity.'07 
The characteristics of these affiliation agreements are highly conducive 
to the type of search process that is necessary to assuage the fears of law 
firms about the effects of a contemplated merger. The fact that a core 
feature of these agreements is a commitment to refrain from negotiating 
or  creating voluntary professional linkages with other law firms reinforces 
the validity of this claim. Further, the frequent interactions planned for 
105 See John Quinn 'Multidisciplinary Legal Services and Preventative Regulation' in 
Evans and Trebilcock (eds) supra note 7, 329. Quinn argues that concerns over 
dilution of professional independence of lawyers does not provide a justification for 
the broad scope of existing prohibitions on equity participation by non-lawyers. An 
American proposal to modify the structure of the partnership model of the firm in 
a way that is sensitive to consumer needs has been advanced by Stephen Kalish 
'Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise Model 
Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious 
Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees' (1987) 29 Ariwnu LR 563. 
106 	Another metaphor frequently relied upon in explaining these arrangements was that 
filiations provided firms the opportunity to create a bare structure and then slowly 
'put meat on the bone.' 
107 The search rationale has been implicitly invoked by four afliliating Australian firms: 
see C. Brennan 'Four-City Merger Generates New Work and New Ideas' (January1 
February 1985) 59 Law Insf. J. 84. 
members of the law firms, in terms of national specialist practice groups 
and national partner retreats, would give law firms frequent and valuable 
opportunities to assess the quality of their prospective partners. In this 
vein, many lawyers argued as follows: because the firms have not 
integrated their profit centres and, in most cases, have even refrained 
from changing their local names,'08 in the event that the parties decide 
that a merger is not appropriate, the affiliation arrangement can be 
reversed without incurring burdensome resource or reputational costs. 
d.  Destabilized referral arrangements. A final explanation for the wave of 
affiliations turns on the destabilized referral arrangements that followed 
in the wake of the first set of national afiliations. Frequently during the 
course of the interview process, lawyers would comment on the increas- 
ing levels of economic power and, hence, legal activity concentrated in 
Toronto. Virtually every firm interviewed outside Toronto commented 
on the centripetal forces at play in Canada, which have effected a massive 
transfer of economic power and, hence, legal work to T~ronto. '"~ In
Montreal, many of the firms commented on the devastating effect of the 
exodus of banks and insurance companies to Toronto following the 
election of the Parti QuCbCcois government in 1976.To some extent, this 
flight of capital has been recently tempered by the rise of strong 
indigenous financial institutions such as the Caisse de dCpGt et placement 
du Quebec and Le Mouvement des caisses populaires Desjardins. 
Nevertheless, many of the firms stated that, for all intents and purposes, 
'Toronto was calling the shots.' In Calgary, the era of cheap oil and the 
widely condemned national energy policy were ascribed with respon- 
sibility for the shift in economic power to Toronto. Finally, in Vancouver, 
the wave of consolidations in the forestry and resources industry, and the 
acquisition of these companies by the leading Canadian families located 
in Central Canada, were viewed as the source of Toronto's growing 
domination. 
The consequence of this shift for law firms outside Toronto was 
devastating. Lawyers in many of the non-Toronto firms reported an 
alarming decline in billings. Lawyers in other non-Toronto firms stated 
108 That is, affiliating firms retained their local names and then created a name for the 
national affiliation group, which would be identified on each member firm's 
letterhead. 
109 Toronto's domination was replicated in the afliliation arrangements concluded 
between Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver firms. Many firms likened this tripartite 
model to a 'hub and spoke' system, where the Toronto firm was the hub and the 
other firms the spokes. 
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that although their billings had remained constant, the quality and com- 
plexity of work had declined markedly over the past decade. And, most 
importantly, with few exceptions, many of the non-Toronto firms ac- 
knowledged a much greater dependence on referral work from Toronto 
for their practices. 
In this scenario, the first wave of affiliations can be credited with 
setting off a domino effect or, more colloquially, a rat race, that worked 
to destabilize many of the traditional agency relationships that Toronto 
firms had concluded with firms located in other parts of the country."O 
Once a Toronto firm linked up with firms in Vancouver and Montreal, 
whatever loose referral arrangements existed prior to the affiliation 
between the Toronto firm and other firms in Vancouver and Montreal 
were severed. That is, even under the terms of the lightest referral 
arrangement, the Toronto firm would invariably be under an obligation 
to refer work requiring counsel in either Montreal or Vancouver to the 
firm's affiliate in either city. As a consequence, non-affiliated firms in 
Montreal and Vancouver would refrain from referring work to an 
affiliated Toronto firm 'because the Toronto firm couldn't return the 
favour.' As well as the loss in reciprocal referral work, many non-
affiliated firms outside Toronto expressed the concern that a referral to 
a Toronto firm risked the danger that the Toronto firm would attempt 
to 'steal the client' by using the referral transaction as an opportunity to 
sell the client on the services of the Toronto firm's affiliate in the 
referring firm's jurisdiction."' Both of these concerns forced firms outside 
Toronto to follow the leader by entering into separate affiliations with 
Toronto firms. Mirroring these trends, unaffiliated Toronto firms - also 
fearful of the prospect of client stealing resulting from referrals to 
affiliated firms in other jurisdictions - found that the pool of possible 
firms to which they could refer work outside Toronto was dwindling 
rapidly. The more that this pool shrank, the more anxious unaffiliated 
Toronto firms became with the quality of unaffiliated firms remaining in 
Vancouver and Montreal. This concern propelled the Toronto firms' 
affiliations with unaffiliated firms remaining in Montreal and Vancouver. 
110 The term rat race is taken from G. Akerlof 'The Economics of Caste and of the 
Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales' (1976) 90 Q. J. of Econ. 599. According to 
Akerlof, '[iln the rat race the chances of getting the cheese increase with the speed 
of the rat, although no additional cheese is provided' (at 603). 
111 Interestingly, prior to the wave of affiliations, most firms professed to have no 
institutional commitments to refer work to firms in other cities. In the main, the 
referral decision was remitted to individual partners, without any outside 
interference. This laissez-faire attitude resulted in fairly random referral patterns in 
most firms insofar as firms in another city were concerned. 
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If correct, this scenario has profound implications for the survival of 
these recently minted affiliations. While some national affiliations were 
no doubt provoked by the pursuit of real efficiencies, the fact that many 
are predicated on defensive concerns suggests that not all were designed 
to obtain such benefits. If this is accurate, one can expect consumers to 
push for a dismantling of these costly affiliations in short order. Indeed, 
several lawyers claimed that a number of the largest corporations were 
undermining the survival of affiliations by refusing to have their work 
directed to designated affiliates. Under this scenario, the open question 
is what the effect of these affiliations is on the welfare of less sophisticated 
consumers. Will their welfare be augmented by the benefits from 
increased levels of national interaction, or will it be compromised by the 
fact that their out-of-province agency work is being driven by affiliate 
obligations rather than professional expertise? 
D. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
1. The greenfield arrangement explored 
As mentioned above, to the degree that Canadian law firms have en- 
deavoured to enter foreign markets, they have relied principally on entry 
by way of greenfield branches rather than on other, less costly instru- 
ments, namely aff~liation."' By and large, these ventures were aimed at 
cultivating foreign clients interested in undertaking investment activity in 
112 	There were some exceptions to this general rule. In Calgary, at least two firms had 
concluded affiliation arrangements with American law firms, having specialized 
expertise in the oil and gas industry. In Toronto, there is some evidence of growing 
affiliation activity between firms in that city and firms in Hong Kong (for example, 
Smith Lyons; Davies Ward & Beck). Another way in which Canadian firms have 
affiliated with foreign law firms is through membership in large transnational 
affiliations such as Lex Mundi and Norton RoseIM5. Lex Mundi provides a 
framework for the professional exchange of information about the development of 
local and international law among its members. Each member firm retains complete 
autonomy and is not restricted in referring, handling, or accepting cases, nor in 
joining other professional organizations. Members are not allowed to use Lex Mundi 
on their letterheads, and the association does not undertake advertising or 
marketing. However, a confluence of several factors worked to undermine the 
commitment of Canadian firms to these enterprises, including: (1) the large size of 
these affiliations and the lack of supportive personal relationships; (2) the fact that 
competitors located in the same Canadian city were sometimes members of the same 
referral group; (3) the relatively shallow nature of the commitments entailed by the 
organization; and (4) the existence of foreign branches of the Canadian firm, 
supported independently or with other affiliates, in markets where the firm had the 
most expertise and interest. 
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Canada, although there were some notable exception^."^ These excep- 
tions usually took the form of firms serving very explicit needs of 
established clients in a specific market - for example, the decision by 
Toronto firms to open offices in London to service the legal needs of 
Canadian clients in Euromarket borrowings. And although a handful of 
firms asserted broader ambitions for their foreign offices, these aspira- 
tions are suspect, given the onerous restrictions on the capacity of 
Canadian firms to practice indigenous law in most foreign jurisdictions. 
These restrictions limit Canadian lawyers to refer and accompany 
Canadian clients to local lawyers practising indigenous law. Presumably, 
there are natural limits operating on the willingness of Canadian clients 
to compensate firms for 'chaperon' services."* 
Table 6 shows that the foreign offices of Canadian firms are concen- 
trated principally in London and Hong Kong, with Taipei, New York, 
and Paris being important secondary locations. By and large, most 
branches were now being operated - at least in name - by Canadian 
affiliate groups. While most affiliations supported one foreign office, 
others have supported as many as four. Usually, primary responsibility 
for the staffing and operation of the foreign office was allocated to one 
of the affiliating firms, with provision for minor participation by the other 
affiliates. The lead or managing affiliate for Far Eastern offices was 
usually the Vancouver firm; for London and New York, the Toronto 
firm; and for Continental Europe, the Montreal firm. This pattern is 
consistent with the nature and flow of business activity between Canadian 
and foreign cities. In a few cases, however, a committee of senior 
partners from the affiliating firms assumed collective responsibility for 
management of the foreign offices, with no single firm playing a pre- 
eminent role. 
Interestingly, in most cases, the international offices were organized 
under a separately constituted partnership among the affiliates, with each 
affiliate having equal rights and obligations for partnership profits and 
losses. Nevertheless, despite the relatively clear sharing rules implied by 
the partnership form of organization, the actual allocation of profits and 
losses pursuant to these arrangements was anything but straightforward. 
In many cases partners confessed that answering the logically prior 
113 As a number of firms stated, the opening of foreign ofices is basically a way of 
searching for 'high net worth individuals' or 'elephants' who are anxious to 
undertake extensive investment in Canada. Many firms were inspired by the success 
of Stikeman Elliott in cultivating the patronage of Mr Li Ka-Shing. 
114 As one lawyer stated, 'Canadian clients do not need Canadian lawyers to serve as 
glorified taxi drivers in London and Paris.' 
question of where and in what amounts expenditures and revenues 
having an international aspect would be allocated, that is, either to the 
international partnership or directly to the affiliates, proved to be a 
highly fractious exercise, given that in the former case the affiliates share 
equally, while in the latter case, the entire benefit or burden of the 
activity inures to one of the affiliates. 
The inversion of predicted outcomes (extensive reliance on affiliations) 
and actual outcomes (extensive reliance on greenfield entry) is rendered 
even more perplexing when the very considerable cost of greenfield entry 
is con~idered."~Most firms interviewed admitted that, under any 
accounting measure, the economic performance of their affiliates was 
disastrous. And although a part of the losses was attributed to high start- 
up costs, a number of lawyers expressed concern with the potential for 
these costs to persist at the same or higher levels for several years, 
creating further losses for the participating affiliates. Another factor 
contributing to the concern over the financial viability of foreign offices 
is the tendency of Canadian affiliate groups to follow each other in 
establishing branches in the same foreign jurisdiction. If the rationale for 
foreign offices is based on the prospect of diverting a fixed supply of 
work of foreign clients to the Canadian affiliates, then, cetmk paribus, the 
entry of multiple firms into the same jurisdiction will result in a situation 
where too many firms are chasing too few clients, ensuring that, in the 
short run at least, no office is able to earn a normal rate of return. 
2. Alternative explanations for international greenfielding 
In view of the inherent expense and risk of the greenfield route in the 
international context, why have Canadian firms favoured this technique 
over other available instruments of growth, particularly the affiliation 
instrument? Several possible explanations exist, including: (a) main- 
tenance of non-exclusive agency relationships; (b) uncertain liability 
effects; and (c) lack of opportunities for effective pre-association 
investigation. I will examine each of these in turn. 
a. Maintenance of non-exclusive agency relationships. One possible explana- 
tion for the reluctance of firms to enter into affiliation relationships 
115 	These costs should not be measured solely in financial terms. Among the costs that 
firms have to concern themselves with are the costs of sending senior counsel to the 
foreign jurisdiction to set up the branch. As one partner told us, 'any partner good 
enough, in terms of his or her technical expertise and entrepreneurial skills, to be 
vested with the responsibility of establishing a new office in a foreign country is 
someone whose absence will be deeply felt in the main office.' 
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reflects the unwillingness of law firms, both in Canada and abroad, to 
compromise the current set of nonexclusive agency relationships that 
exist between Canadian and foreign firms. In the absence of destabilizing 
first moves, such as the much ballyhooed but yet to be consummated 
great trans-Atlantic a~sociation,"~ firms prefer to maintain the rather 
haphazard pattern of existing referral arrangements. As pointed out in 
the discussion respecting national affiliations, a strong case can be made 
that these informal arrangements are better equipped to vindicate 
consumer welfare goals than the highly orchestrated firm-to-firm 
relationships flowing from the affiliation model. And, most importantly, 
given that the creation of an exclusive referral relationship with one firm 
resident in a foreign jurisdiction entails an inevitable termination of 
relationships with other firms in the jurisdiction, firms may be reluctant 
to upset a stable supply of referral work from many firms in favour of 
more speculative benefits that are to be derived from an exclusive 
relationship with one firm. Not surprisingly, this reluctance will be 
greatest among firms that, owing to their strong reputation, are able to 
capture more than a pro ratu share of referral work from foreign 
jurisdictions. In these terms, the decision to open a foreign office abroad 
is consistent with respect for the current set of informal referral 
arrangements. By refusing to practice indigenous law and by not aligning 
themselves with any particular foreign firm, lawyers going abroad are 
able to enhance their market share without alienating firms resident in 
the foreign juri~diction."~ However, as was discussed in the context of 
national affiliations, given the vulnerability of these informal arrange- 
ments to destabilizing first moves resulting in the establishment of formal 
affiliation arrangements, it is not clear that the greenfield strategy is 
sustainable over the long run. Accordingly, it may be far more sensible 
for firms to reconcile themselves to a obtaining a more certain but more 
modest share of referral work by way of affiliation rather than opting for 
riskier greenfield strategies. 
b. Uncertain liability effects. Another impediment to the affiliation route 
in an international context emanates from the uncertain prospects of 
116 The great trans-Atlantic merger has been 'imminent' for several years, and, when 
effected, is expected to involve a leading American, English, and, perhaps, Canadian 
law firm. 
117 Presumably, the assiduously cultivated independence of the two New York firms 
practising law in Toronto (Shearman Sterling; Skadden Arps) is based on the desire 
to avoid jeopardizing existing referral arrangements. It is, of course, questionable 
whether this strategy will be adhered to, given additional entry of other American 
firms to Canada. 
legal liability for the Canadian firm from the conduct of lawyers in the 
foreign jurisdiction. Even though most affiliation arrangements imply the 
continuation of separately constituted firms, the ambiguity inherent in 
the affiliation device, in respect of the degree of integration created 
among the firms, raises the prospect of latent liability for acts done by the 
foreign affiliate over which the Canadian firm has little, if any, control. 
These concerns are heightened by the limited understanding of Canadian 
lawyers with the actual standard of legal and ethical duties that govern 
the conduct of lawyers in the foreign country. Many lawyers interviewed 
explained that the fear of unknown liabilities stemming from foreign 
affiliations is especially significant in the case of law firms, given the 
presence of highly specialized and only partially diversified investments 
by lawyers in human capital and unlimited personal liability for partner- 
ship debts. Nevertheless, one suspects that market insurance contracts 
would be available to reduce at least part of the risk, making this factor 
a somewhat tenuous basis for rejecting foreign affiliations. 
c. Lack of opportunities for effective pre-association investigation. The final 
reason for Canadian law firms eschewing the affiliation instrument in 
favour of greenfielding relates to the limited opportunities for firms to 
acquire sufficient information about a potential affiliation partner prior 
to the affiliation. Since even the shallowest affiliation requires some 
investment in rationalization and coordination activities and ties up some 
portion of the firm's reputational capital, Canadian firms will wish to gain 
some comfort about the quality of their partner. But, because oppor- 
tunities for intense firm-to-firm contacts are necessarily less frequent in 
the case of international as opposed to national associations, the potential 
for extensive pre-association investigation of the other firm is commen- 
surately reduced. Nevertheless, as the pace of transnational economic 
activity accelerates, one would expect such problems to become less 
severe, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of these relationships. 
VI Conclusion 
In this article, I have attempted to enrich our understanding of the 
corporate law firm by considering its evolution in Canada over the last 
decade. Not only did I find that the pressure for the Canadian law firm 
to grow derived from an amalgam of different supply- and demand-side 
factors, but I also found that there are myriad different instruments that 
can be deployed to realize law firm growth, each of which has quite 
different value depending on the context in which the growth is to be 
effected. Nevertheless, despite considerable effort in the development of 
a theoretical framework that would illuminate patterns of growth, exami- 
nation of actual growth patterns discloses a puzzling chasm between 
theory and praxis. Although I offered several possible explanations for 
the divergence, none seemed wholly satisfactory, and further work is 
needed to understand why certain seemingly perverse organizational 
developments have taken place. 
Yet, despite the inability of the theoretical framework to adequately 
predict patterns of growth, it seems that the correct approach to take 
when examining the law firm is to focus on the rationale for growth and 
the instruments of growth. Far too much effort in organizational theory 
has been directed to the task of providing rationales for highly simplistic 
and static conceptions of various organizational forms that abstract 
liberally from reality. This penchant is surprising given the premium that 
organizational theorists have placed on Darwinian survival mechanisms 
in explaining the triumph of certain economic institutions. If, to 
paraphrase Sartre, the organization, like persons, is constantly in the 
process of becoming, it behooves scholars to direct far greater attention 
to the highly charged and dynamic market processes that exert a daily 
influence on the firm. So doing will illuminate those features of the legal 
landscape that either impede or nurture the firm's natural evolutionary 
processes.'18 
118 	The spirited debate between Jack Carr and Frank Mathewson and Ronald Gilson 
respecting the impact of unlimited liability on the structure of the legal industry has 
provided a good example of the kind of questions policy-makers should be thinking 
about: see Carr and Mathewson 'Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry' supra 
note 7 and Gilson 'Unlimited Liability and Law Firm Organization' supra note 7. 
You have printed the following article:
Growing Pains: The Why and How of Law Firm Expansion
Ronald J. Daniels
The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. 147-206.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0042-0220%28199321%2943%3A2%3C147%3AGPTWAH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G
This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an
off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please
visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.
[Footnotes]
7 Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry
Jack L. Carr; G. Frank Mathewson
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 4. (Aug., 1988), pp. 766-784.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198808%2996%3A4%3C766%3AULAABT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K
10 Earning and Learning in Law Firms
Arleen Leibowitz; Robert Tollison
The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Jan., 1978), pp. 65-81.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-2530%28197801%297%3A1%3C65%3AEALILF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
11 The Nature of the Firm
R. H. Coase
Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16. (Nov., 1937), pp. 386-405.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28193711%292%3A4%3A16%3C386%3ATNOTF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
13 Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
Armen A. Alchian; Harold Demsetz
The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197212%2962%3A5%3C777%3APICAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
http://www.jstor.org
LINKED CITATIONS
- Page 1 of 3 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
14 Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama; Michael C. Jensen
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference
Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun., 1983), pp. 301-325.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2186%28198306%2926%3A2%3C301%3ASOOAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
18 Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law Firms: An Alternative Hypothesis
Fred S. Mc Chesney
The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2. (Jun., 1982), pp. 379-393.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-2530%28198206%2911%3A2%3C379%3ATPMAPS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R
24 Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market
Richard H. Sander; E. Douglass Williams
Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Summer, 1989), pp. 431-479.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0897-6546%28198922%2914%3A3%3C431%3AWATSML%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
24 Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms
Robert L. Nelson
American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1. (Winter, 1981), pp. 95+97-140.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-9486%28198124%296%3A1%3C95%3APAPSCA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
32 The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for the Supply of Lawyers
B. Peter Pashigian
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Apr., 1977), pp. 53-85.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2186%28197704%2920%3A1%3C53%3ATMFLTD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
49 Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
Stewart Macaulay
American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Feb., 1963), pp. 55-67.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28196302%2928%3A1%3C55%3ANRIBAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
http://www.jstor.org
LINKED CITATIONS
- Page 2 of 3 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
96 Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior
Oliver E. Williamson
The American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 5. (Dec., 1963), pp. 1032-1057.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28196312%2953%3A5%3C1032%3AMDABB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T
110 The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales
George Akerlof
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4. (Nov., 1976), pp. 599-617.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28197611%2990%3A4%3C599%3ATEOCAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
http://www.jstor.org
LINKED CITATIONS
- Page 3 of 3 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
